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Letter from the Department of Political Science

The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to present
Volume 5 of The Ramerican Political Science Review.
The five papers featured in this volume ask normatively important questions that impact global
affairs and domestic politics. In doing so, the authors of these papers offer important insights into
problems that are often debate by policy makers worldwide, as well as those problems that are
often overlooked.
We hope that these articles will not only help to provide better understanding of relevant questions
concerning the state of our politics, but also that they help inspire new questions for our readers.
Furthermore, we hope that the work of this volume’s authors will encourage other students to
submit their own research for consideration in upcoming volumes of The Ramerican Political
Science Review.
While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science, the final product is the work
of a student editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion. This
year, over fifty submissions were received and reviewed by the editors. The featured authors
went through a “revise and resubmit” process wherein they made content and style changes that
were requested by the editorial staff. This final product is a testament to the editors’ and authors’
immense efforts working collaboratively throughout the summer in uncertain circumstances
brought upon by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Political Science would, therefore,
like to thank this year’s editorial board:
Ross Atkinson
Anna Connor
Chava Evans
Jasmine Frazier
Brody Moon
The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf for
advising our student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing submissions
and formatting this journal.
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Analyzing the Accuracy of Early Warning Systems in the Field of Modern
Genocide and Suggested Changes: A Comparative Case Study of
Myanmar, Rwanda, and Darfur
Jhanys Gardner, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
This paper was written to explore the current Early Warning Systems in place for
recognizing indicators of an impending genocide or mass atrocity. The research consisted of a
comparative analysis of each system’s strengths and weaknesses in prediction. Specifically, the
comparison focused on four well known Early Warning Systems in the field of genocide studies.
The research showed quantitative systems of prediction were far less accurate than their
qualitative counterparts, and that Dr. Gregory Stanton’s “Stages of Genocide” was a successful
Early Warning System. After analyzing each system, recommendations for improvement were
applied to fill the gaps in prediction. These recommendations were centered around creating a
better predictive model for “modern genocide.” To do this, several subsections are recommended
for Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System. These subsections include “Dehumanization and
Propaganda,” “Extermination Using Mass Rape” and “Extermination Through Attrition.” The case
studies for each, in the order stated above, were Myanmar, Rwanda, and Darfur. With these
subsets, the predictive models become more descriptive; the subsections are meant to act as
guides to show what some of these stages may look like outside of the general conception of the
stages of genocide. These assumptions are likely informed by the well-known events of the
Holocaust, though that is not representative of every genocide.
Analyzing the Accuracy of Early Warning Systems in the Field of Modern Genocide and
Suggested Changes: A Comparative Case Study of Myanmar, Rwanda, and Darfur
Genocide existed long before Raphael Lemkin coined the term for it in 1944 (Mulligan,
2013). Though he gave the atrocity a name which almost everyone knows today, there are plenty
of examples in ancient history where genocide occured. The Romans with Carthage, the
Athenians with Melos, and the several biblical occurrences are only some of the many examples
provided by history. However, it wasn’t until the last decade or so that modern society developed
the technology, knowledge, and awareness of genocide and its warnings that Early Warning
Systems began to flourish. Many were created in the pursuit of preventing future genocide, but
few have gained enough attention or accuracy to be widely considered or consulted by the
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international institutions they would be useful to. This paper seeks to analyze which of these Early
Warning Systems is the most accurate in predicting modern genocide, as well as how the most
successful system might be further improved. To illustrate improvements to Early Warning
Systems, three case studies and the ways they indicated an imminent genocide will be discussed.
Defining Modern Genocide
Many scholars have their own definition for what can and cannot be classified as modern
genocide. For the purpose of this paper, genocide is any mass killing or purposeful erasure
conducted on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion with the intent to eradicate culture
or people. Modern genocides are those atrocities which have occurred after the ratification of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (heretofore referred to
as the UNCG) by the United Nations General Assembly on January 12, 1951. The reasoning in
this definition lies in several factors discussed below.
The systems of prediction considered in this paper did not come into being until the late
twentieth to early twenty-first century, and therefore have mainly focused on genocides
perpetrated before their creation. Secondly, this paper is concerned with genocides committed
after the ratification of the UNCG, since the purpose of predicting modern genocide is to hopefully
prevent or punish it. Mass atrocities which occurred before the ratification are unable to be
punished, but everything which has occurred afterwards and falls within the bounds of the UNCG
can be. Therefore, the cases discussed in this paper will have taken place since the UNCG
entered into force in 1951. Lastly, the killing of people of a minority political ideology, known as
politicide, is not included in this paper’s definition of genocide, not because it is considered less
important but because it is excluded from the UNCG. Therefore, any cases of politicide mentioned
within the Early Warning Systems addressed will not be included in the final ruling of their
accuracy.
There are plenty of criticisms of the UNCG and its limitations and narrowness laid out by
scholars, but—although many of the criticisms are well founded—this paper will rely on the
boundaries set by the convention. Such emphasis is placed on the UNCG because of its legal
capabilities to intervene in and punish genocide (which are both ultimate goals of Early Warning
Systems). In a resource edited by Samuel Totten, the reasoning for using the UNCG as a standard
is best illustrated when he states:
...definitions [created by genocide scholars as criticism of the UNCG’s definition] are
irrelevant vis-a-vis international law, for only the definition in the United Nations
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is used to
prosecute the perpetuation of genocide (Totten, 2006).
The one issue with using the definition found in the UNCG and only viewing those cases
of genocide which have been acknowledged and legally recognized by the United Nations is the
rarity. For the purpose of this paper, any genocide—whether legally recognized as such or not
due to the issue of realpolitik—that fits the definition of genocide in the UNCG will be considered
when analyzing the accuracy of Early Warning Systems. This is because without this provision
only a handful of genocides could be used to test the predictive capacities of the systems. Only
three cases of genocide have been legally recognized and punished: Rwanda, Bosnia, and
Cambodia (Burns, 2018). With this slightly modified application of the UNCG definition
established, it can be applied to determine the accuracy of the Early Warning Systems considered
in this paper.
Comparative Analysis
The 10 Stages of Genocide by Dr. Gregory Stanton
Dr. Gregory Stanton’s (2013) comprehensive list of the different stages of genocide takes
a descriptive approach to the prediction of genocide. Originally, there were eight stages of
genocide in Dr. Stanton’s 1998 version of his Early Warning System, but this was later expanded
to ten stages in 2013 when more data was considered and gaps were found in the predictive
capacity of the system. The system was created on the premise that an Early Warning System
should exist in stages in order to reflect the progression of the situation. The stages act as
indicators, broad enough to encompass many different events to better recognize and alert
scholars when indicators of a potential future genocide arise. Dr. Stanton’s system holds the
priority of flagging a developing situation as soon as possible so international institutions can
protect against genocide in the long-term. After all, Early Warning Systems exist in order to
prevent genocides from happening, but if adequate and efficient methods of responding to the
warning signs of a genocide are not taken nothing will be prevented. In Dr. Stanton’s own words,
“Early warning is meaningless without early response. But early warning is the necessary first
step toward prevention” (Stanton, 2009, p. 319).
The original eight stages were Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization,
Organization, Polarization, Preparation, Extermination, and Denial (Stanton, 1998). Later, the list
was expanded with the stages of Discrimination and Persecution. The stages don’t have to occur
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in order, though it makes sense that events will progress to the next stage in the list as stakes
rise and the situation grows closer to genocide (Stanton, 2013). The stages are as follows:
1. Classification: cultures naturally divide themselves into categories to provide an
“us vs. them” mentality, which leads to an increase in scapegoating and conflict
escalation. This is particularly damaging and can lead to genocide in a society
where there is little-to-no merging between these strictly classified groups.
2. Symbolization: this stage further encourages classification of individuals and
people into groups, marking them more starkly as an “other” and making them
easy to identify. Symbols of status are not necessarily a trigger for this stage, but
ones backed by hate, discrimination, or dehumanization are. An example of
symbolization would be the yellow Star of David Jewish people were forced to wear
under the Nazi regime.
3. Discrimination: beyond discrimination enacted by individuals (though that can
certainly be a part of it), a regime revoking rights from a group (voting rights, civil
rights, citizenship, etc.) can be a strong indicator of a possible future genocide.
4. Dehumanization: equating a specific people group to something sub-human. In
this stage, propaganda is spread and the dominant or oppressive group is
indoctrinated to believe the oppressed are undeserving of their rights and lives,
and that they represent everything unholy or immoral.
5. Organization: similar to preparation, the organization is usually where state
governments are seen arming militia groups—or militia groups are arming
themselves—to organize for an eventual attack. State governments often find
ways to arm militia groups instead of enacting the violence themselves so they can
distance themselves from blame and punishment when the violence is over.
6. Polarization: a continued and concentrated effort to increase the distance between
groups using the stages above is implemented either through formal means
(passing laws limiting interaction between groups) or informal means, such as
propaganda.
7. Preparation: the step up from organization, [this is when] actual attacks and plans
for violence are laid out. Weapons are bought, troops are gathered and trained,
and the coming violence is rarely referred to as genocide.
8. Persecution: victims are separated out to be killed or detained. Children are
separated from their parents, genocide through attrition begins, segregation
occurs, and concentration camps (or similar systems) may be constructed.
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9. Extermination: the actual act of killing. Usually occurs very quickly in cases of mass
killing (slowly in cases of genocide through attrition), mass rape, and destruction
of cultural and ethnic artifacts. The goal is to eradicate every aspect of the people
group.
10. Denial: the most enduring stage, denial can be a never ending struggle best fought
by trying to punish perpetrators and fighting against the realpolitik that makes that
process difficult.
(Stanton, 2013).
Dr. Stanton believes genocide can be prevented at any stage before extermination, but
different stages call for different actions. Necessary intervention becomes more forceful and
potentially violent as the situation progresses. The benefits of a system dictated by qualitative
stages is in its descriptive and broad nature. Many questionable and harmful actions taken by a
government or [group of] people can be included in the stages. Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning
System has been vastly successful in tracking potential genocides, as will be explained later in
this paper.
The ability to monitor an ongoing situation while applying broad parameters to unfolding
events allows for continual monitoring in the field of genocide. Dr. Stanton’s system benefits from
continual use and application through the associated site “Genocide Watch.” The site was
founded in 1999 by the Alliance Against Genocide with the help of Dr. Stanton and several other
scholars (Genocide Watch- Our Mission, n.d.). The site utilizes Dr. Stanton’s stages along with
the accounts of reporters, journalists, humanitarian relief workers, and those conducting field
studies in “at risk” countries to inform the decision of which countries should be placed on their
“Countries at Risk” list. This countries on the list are placed into one (or sometimes two) of three
levels of threat: Genocide Watch, Genocide Warning, Genocide Emergency. A Genocide Watch
is in place when the conditions in the country align with one or more of the ten stages of genocide
in Dr. Stanton’s early warning system. A Genocide Warning is added when it becomes clear that
preparatory action is being taken to commit a genocidal event. A Genocide Emergency is when
the genocidal event is being carried out; this is the hardest stage to intervene at, as it often
requires the use of force. The status of countries is updated regularly (whenever new information
is learned) and updating the status of states adds urgency to the call for intervention. As a situation
is upgraded from a Genocide Watch to a Genocide Warning, the need for action is emphasized
to stop it before it turns into a Genocide Emergency.
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Barbara Harff
While Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System relies heavily on a qualitative approach to
prediction, Barbara Harff places emphasis on quantitative analysis in her model. This is evident
in both her methodolgy for creating the system and in her definition of what she considers
genocide or politicide. Although Harff’s study does include politicides, any included in her research
will be omitted from this paper where possible. The methodology for the creation of the system
was based on a large-N comparative analysis of genocides and politicides from history. Harff
states her scholarly definition of genocide and politicide as:
...the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing
elites or their agents — or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities —
that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal, political, or politicized
communal group. In genocides, the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of
their communal characteristics… (Harff & Gurr, 1998).
Harff’s definition of genocide and the qualification for what she includes as a case is very
quantitative. The quantitative nature in Harff’s definition is clearly seen in the language used when
she states that a genocide involves, “the deaths of a substantial portion” of a communal group.
However, no guideline is given for how many people or what percentage of a population is
considered “substantial.” This is different from the approach of the United Nations definition which
relies on the intent behind killings (in this sense, a specific number is not necessary) (“Convention
on the Prevention and…, 1951). Barbara Harff addresses her choice to make her assessment
more quantitative on the need for a stable variable; since intent is difficult to prove, numbers of
deaths was a far more applicable variable for determining what could and couldn’t be considered
genocide or politicide (Harff, 2009, p. 515).
As for predicting a genocide, Harff (2009) used systematic and quantitative research to
propose a new Early Warning System which would consider the statistical patterns found in the
events preceding past genocides. After studying more than 150 countries and their major
historical/humanitarian events since 1955, Harff identified six preconditions for genocidal events:
political upheaval, prior genocides, political systems with exclusionary ideology, ethnic and
religious cleavages, low economic development, and how this genocide will impact international
relationships (Harff, 2003). Harff made it clear in her findings that all of these preconditions appear
to be necessary, but none are sufficient on their own (Harff, 2003, P. 70). Since all preconditions
are necessary, the predictive threshold of the system needs to reflect this. Therefore, when Harff’s
system is analyzed for accuracy, a truly successful prediction can only be claimed when the
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events match all the preconditions; an event exhibiting only a few preconditions would not trigger
the Early Warning System.
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Statistical Approach
Another system which uses a quantitative method in addressing the prediction of genocide
is the one created by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The methods used by the
USHMM predictive model focus heavily on statistical analysis and algorithms. However, when
considering the accuracy of the USHMM predictive model it is important to note the USHMM
hasn't released the official document that explains how their algorithm works. The site makes
references to the algorithm used to determine each country's likelihood of experiencing a
genocidal event without ever fully explaining the details of calculations. This means the USHMM
model is harder to reproduce for testing purposes.
According to the USHMM website, Barbara Harff’s research, as well as that of the Political
Instability Task Force, was drawn on for the algorithms (Early Warning Project, n.d.). The USHMM
used prior research and statistical clues gained from demographics and assigned numerical
values to certain situations (the spread of propaganda, actual killings, redistribution of a minority
population to “camps”, etc.) according to how much their presence indicated an impending
genocide. Based on the compilation of this data, a system was created to rank countries from
most to least likely to experience a genocidal event. Before 2017, the algorithm was only focused
on the likelihood of state-sponsored mass killings. What was found was:
...factors associated with greater risk of mass killing include history of mass killing, large
population size, high infant mortality, ethnic fractionalization, high battle-related deaths,
ban on opposition parties, existence of politically motivated killings, lack of freedom of
movement, repression of civil society, coup attempts within the last five years, and
anocratic regime type (i.e., neither full democracy nor full autocracy) (Early Warning
Project, n.d.).
Once these factors have been identified and countries have been checked for their
presence, countries are sorted into risk categories based on where their risk percentage places
them on a list of countries. One significant thing to note about this particular system is that during
the creation of the algorithm, data from states with fewer than half a million citizens were not
included (Ulfelder 2013). While cursory research proves that no modern genocides have been
reported in these states, the exclusion may cause smaller states to be overlooked if or when
violence does start to unfold. Despite this, the model presented by the USHMM boasts an alleged
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80% success rate in determining which states will experience mass killings within the next year
(later changed to within the next two years in 2017 [Early Warning Project, n.d.]). However, the
technical paper outlining how they calculated this success rate has not been released for public
viewing and therefore the success rate must be determined by its correct predictions. To
determine the success of the system, this paper will instead view the rankings from past years
and see whether the predictions of genocide were right.
The United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes
It would be a vast oversight to use the definition of genocide laid out in the UNCG without
also including the framework they use to asses the risk of genocide happening. Because the
Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (FAAC) was made by researchers working in tandem
with the United Nations, it uses the definition of genocide established in the UNCG. However, the
framework goes one step further and expands the analysis to include crimes against humanity
and war crimes (United Nations, 2014).
The FAAC has two levels of risk factors, separated by how applicable they are to each of
the three categories of mass atrocities: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Risk
factors common to all atrocities are included under the term “common risk factors,” while those
only found in some atrocities are called “specific risk factors” (United Nations, 2014). The most
important aspect to note from the report on the FAAC is that the assessment of a state being at
risk of experiencing an atrocity is not dependent on the presence of all risk factors (United Nations,
2014, p. 6). Therefore, most risk factors can be present without the state experiencing an atrocity,
or only a few could be present before an atrocity breaks out. The FAAC stresses the importance
of taking notice of any situation where one or several risk factors are present, not just situations
where all risk factors have occured.
The risk factors stated in the FAAC include the following common risk factors: situations
of instability or armed conflict, past records of serious international human rights violations,
weakened state structure, clear motives or incentives to commit atrocities, capacity to commit
atrocities, absence of mitigation strategies to avoid violations, preparatory action, and triggering
factors (United Nations, 2014). As for the specific risk factors mentioned in the FAAC, this paper
will focus only on the specific risk factors given for genocide. The specific risk factors include:
tension between intergroups, discrimination against a protected group, or signs of harboring an
intent to destroy a protected group (United Nations, 2014, p. 18-19).
One important thing mentioned in the FAAC is that “...although it is impossible to draw a
direct causal relation between the presence of particular risk factors and the occurrence of atrocity
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crimes, these crimes are rarely committed in the absence of all or most of the risk factors…”
(United Nations, 2014, p. 7). Human behavior, especially thoughts and actions taken against
others with the intent to do harm, is largely unpredictable. However, there are certain events that
these systems can recognize and use to serve as indicators for international organizations that
illustrate the need for mitigation.
A feature of the FAAC that makes it easier to use are the indicators (or subsections) of
the risk factors. These indicators provide useful examples of what the risk factors may look like in
practice. For example, one of the indicators under “Enabling circumstances or preparatory action”
is “Marking of people or their property based on affiliation to a group” (United Nations, 2014, p.
16). This is similar to the stage of Symbolization in Dr. Stanton’s descriptive prediction model
(Stanton, 2013).
Determining the Most Accurate Early Warning System
To determine the success rate of current Early Warning Systems, one must first look to
the cases predicted in the past as well as cases predicted in the present. A successful Early
Warning System must predict genocides before they occur, which means systems will become
less accurate as they fail to predict or warn of a genocide that has since occured. Failing to
acknowledge current genocides also leads to lower accuracy. That being said, any countries
considered to be “high risk” for a genocidal event by any system but have no reports of genocide
as of the time of this paper (May 2020) will not be penalized. This is because of the changing
nature of genocide and how quickly situations could dissolve in the future. Another factor to
consider is the lack of updates and application given to Harff’s Early Warning System. Since the
UHMM model was based in large part on Harff’s work, the UHMM model will be applied as both
a representation of the application of her work and its own. With this established, the most
accurate system must be determined based on case studies of current and recent genocides
before suggestions can be made.
There are several areas of concern that have not been addressed by any of the
aforementioned EWSs. Brazil’s growing risk of genocide—whether through targeted killing or
attrition—against indigenous peoples under the policies of Jair Bolsonaro is an example of a crisis
which has not been addressed by any of the systems (Branford, 2020). Brazil is not included on
the map of at-risk countries or on any of the posted lists from the past two prediction cycles (Early
Warning Project, 2018). The cultural genocide occurring against the Uyghurs in China is currently
only being viewed as a cultural genocide with the potential to escalate. This issue has only been
recognized in blog posts written by contributors to Genocide Watch and non-assciated media
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sites like BBC that are referenced by Genocide Watch, the site associated with the application of
Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System (BBC News, 2020). While China is on the top 30 list of
countries at risk for mass killings created by the UHMM algorithm, it is at the bottom of the ranking
of countries likely to experience a genocidal event and even experienced a 1% decrease in
projected risk despite the increase in evidence pointing toward serious human rights violations
happening in the Xinjiang region (Early Warning Project, 2019).
In many ways, both the Early Warning Project and the Alert List frequently updated by
Genocide Watch have kept up to pace with the unfolding and turbulent situations of mass killing
around the world. However, there is one case that went unpredicted by the Early Warning Project:
the genocidal killings committed by Christian and Muslim militias in the Central African Republic.
Most cases of non-state-led mass killings listed by the Early Warning Project are instead
considered acts of terrorism by Genocide Watch and, as such, are not included in the alerts.
In the end, determining the most accurate Early Warning System comes down to a key
factor: the timeliness of the warning. There are several disadvantages to the scholarly and
statistical prediction systems. Mainly, the systems are rarely updated once created and they are
often left to sit without actually being applied to unfolding situations. Though the Early Warning
Systems may have a high level of accuracy, the algorithms are only run once a year. Given the
rapid rate at which societies can change and the speed with which atrocities tend to occur when
they reach the extermination phase, this is unwise. A helpful system should be constantly updated
to fit the needs of a changing world.
The accuracy of the FAAC system has not been mentioned here because, other than the
few cases of United Nations intervention in countries facing humanitarian crises which could lead
to genocide, there is little to show for the FAAC actually being used by the UN (Burns, 2018). If it
is being used, the methodology for how it is applied has not been shared. The FAAC claims to
inform decisions on intervention (United Nations, 2014, p. 5), however this is hard to support
without explicit proof. Therefore, although the system seems to be an advanced (or at least more
descriptive) version of Dr. Stanton’s ten stages, it is hard to determine its accuracy without seeing
it in action.
After considering the factors of applied accuracy and timeliness, the most useful and
accurate prediction system appears to be Dr. Stanton’s. The Early Warning Project, though a feat
of great statistical achievement in the field of risk assessment, needs to be tweaked to avoid the
oversight of some cases. Steps for strengthening Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System include
adding more on-the-ground accounts to help determine if stages are being carried out despite the
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denial of a country’s government, and evaluating situations/applying the predictive measures
more frequently.
Seeing as one of the greatest strengths of Dr. Stanton’s model is the level of
descriptiveness it offers, it would be beneficial to focus on that further. Perhaps by adding
indicators, like the ones found in the FAAC system, the ten stage model can provide policy makers
and international organizations with the tools to spot what the different stages might look like.
With a more descriptive system that points out examples of the past and what stages could look
like in future genocidal events, it would be impossible for policy makers to point to the system and
say “well, we didn’t know what we were seeing could lead to/be considered genocide”. It may
force policy makers and the general public to confront the different manifestations of genocide
and what precedes it. Since policy makers are the ones capable of enacting policies of
intervention, it is important that they know the possible signs of genocide and are constantly
updated on which countries are exhibiting those signs. Some possible indicators can be found by
looking at examples of present and recent genocides, as is evidenced in the case studies
discussed below.
Case Studies
Dehumanization and Propaganda: Myanmar (Burma)
Since 1978, the Budhist led government of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has targeted the
minority Rohingya Muslim population. The Rohingya have been subjected to a slow process of
genocide through killings conducted by state-backed civilian populations and state institutions
(Zarni & Cowley, 2014). Over the last decade or so, the violence in Myanmar has escalated, in
part due to the increasing use of social media amongst the general public and the ease with which
anti-Rohingya propaganda can be spread through technology (Facebook admits…, 2018).
Propaganda has always existed, especially anti-Rohingya propaganda, but it has worn many
faces. In an article written about the evolution of the crisis in Myanmar, Maung Zarni and Alice
Cowley (2014) illustrate the prevalence of propaganda when they write:
In Myanmar's state media, official policy documents, and school textbooks, the Rohingya
are referred to as Bengali, a racist local reference, and are portrayed as illegal economic
migrants from the colonial time, who are a 'threat to national security, a portrayal that the
bulk of the Burmese have accepted as a fact over the past five decades (p. 683).
Though there is a historical record of the Rohingya residing within the border of Myanmar
well before British occupation, they are portrayed as foreigners and second-class citizens (Sohel,
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2017). This has not changed in recent years, but the discrimination and dehumanization has
shifted onto a new form of media: the internet. Modern advancements in technology have allowed
for phenomenal achievements in fast and efficient information sharing and communication.
However, this ease and innovation comes with drawbacks and these weaknesses are best seen
in the use of Facebook in Myanmar.
Nearly a decade ago, Facebook didn’t exist for the general public in Myanmar. When the
military dominated Myanmar, the internet was an inaccessible thing for most citizens. After (the
election of) Aung San Suu Kyi, that changed: sim cards and phones became affordable for many
citizens. Since Burmese script was largely unsupported by Google and other search engines but
was supported by Facebook, the social media site soon became a must for anyone with a phone
or internet access (Subedar, 2018). The site was a way to keep in touch with others and get useful
news, but many of these new users were unprepared and untrained in the internet etiquette
needed to avoid the propaganda and false reports put onto the platform by government officials
and anti-Rohingya groups. Catching instances of false reports and hate speech was made more
difficult by a lack of understanding about the nuances of the Burmese language as well as a
shortage in oversight. In 2014, only one Burmese-speaking content monitor was employed by
Facebook (this number has since risen, but is still well behind the number of content monitors for
other languages) (Subedar, 2018).
Facebook has been used in Myanmar by military leaders to sow the seeds of discord and
ethnic tension. Though there have been many efforts to combat this, the damage has been done.
One prime example of Facebook’s impact was seen in 2014, when a false post circulated about
a Muslim man raping a Buddhist woman. The report soon sparked a deadly riot that killed two
men in the country’s second largest city of Mandalay (“False rape claim…” 2014). This and many
other incidents led to the involvement of the UN, who began investigating hate speech in Myanmar
and the role Facebook might have played in the unfolding genocide. As stated in an article posted
by BBC News, “...UN experts concluded the inflammatory material Burmese people had been
exposed to day in, day out had played a role in enabling the military's purge of Rohingya Muslims
from Rakhine state - an attack which the UN believes was genocide” (2018).
In this new age of technology, it is important that scholars studying state-sponsored
violence and genocide recognize the changing face of propoganda and hate speech. The virtue
of propaganda being posted on the internet means the source is much easier to trace in many
ways. However, this is only the case if enough time and effort is put into making and supplying a
system competent enough to find and report those posting false information and harmful
propaganda. One suggestion that could be made after reading through this case study is the
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implementation of a special “watchdog” team; content monitors could be hired strategically to
monitor information coming from areas of unrest. With a significant enough workforce specifically
trained to flag propaganda, hate speech, and inflammatory content, ethnic tension may be
lessened. First, this new age of propaganda must be acknowledged in prediction systems.
Extermination Using Mass Rape: Rwanda
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 unfolded rapidly, birthed from the rising tensions between
the Hutu minority ethnic gourp and the Tutsi majority. By the end of the approximately four-monthlong killing spree, over 800,000 people were dead, and more victims would be added to the list
as a result of mass rape (Sharlach, 2000). Mass rape is a tactic used by perpetrators of genocide
as a way to erase a particular group of people. Sexual violence tends to be underreported both
within and outside of the bounds of genocide, and it often goes undiscussed or ignored in scholarly
analysis. Though rape is never explicitly mentioned amongst the list of genocidal actions in the
UNCG, it could be considered a part of Article II subsections B or D. D is harder to argue without
the presence of significant genital mutilation, but rape used with the intent of forced pregnancy
should be considered. It has also been made clear through past precedent that rape can be
charged at the international level when an individual is on trial for crimes against
humanity/genocide (as was evidenced in the trial against Jean-Paul Akayesu) (Sharlach, 2000).
The pervasiveness of mass rape can be attributed to several different factors. It is a useful
way to spread disease, genes, and shame (especially when mass rape is made into a public
spectacle). While forced impregnation was one of the guiding intentions in cases of mass rape
during the Bosnian genocide (Sharlach, 2000), the Rwandan genocide experienced this
phenomenon in a slightly different way. Though there is little evidence of forced impregnation as
a goal during the mass rapes committed in the Rwandan genocide, there is plenty evidence of
intentional protracted genocide through the purposeful spread of HIV to victims. Most victims
tested positive later and, because Rwanda doesn’t allow inhibitor medicine, later died an AIDs
related death. Some rapists even explicitly stated this as one of their intentions during the assaults
(Sharlach, 2000). There is also evidence that high-ranking government and military officials
sanctioned and encouraged the rape of Tutsi women, as seen by those charged for such crimes
by the international criminal tribunal (Sharlach, 2000).
Other than the spread of disease, there is another strong motivation for mass rape: shame.
This is discussed in the work of Christopher Mullins: mass rape is a tool used (often in patriachical
societies where much importance is placed on virginity and the perceived purity of virginal women)
to degrade women and their families (2009). In some cases, the women will be dismissed as a
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choice for marriage or even expelled from their household and forced to turn to alternate and risky
means of survival. In turn, these responses ultimately contribute to conditions which increase the
death toll associated with a genocide.
Mass rape is almost considered an inevitable part of conflict (and, as such, genocidal
crimes), and yet it is rarely discussed in most scholarly literature. Based on the many examples
of mass rape being used to further genocide, including the intentional spread of HIV to victims in
Rwanda, it is a meaningful factor which should be added to the subsection of extermination.
Genocidal rape and attrition are two methods of genocide that need to be acknowledged by
scholars so policy makers and the general public are aware that genocide is not just the killing of
a people: it can take different forms.
Extermination By Attrition: Darfur
The genocide in Darfur has, for the most part, been a slow process. As mentioned above,
genocide can take different forms and although what often comes to mind is the quick killing of a
people group, attrition is one of those forms. It is a term best described by Sheri Rosenberg (2012)
when she writes, “genocide by attrition essentially describes a slow process of annihilation that
reflects the unfolding phenomenon of the mass killing of a protected group rather than the
immediate unleashing of violent death” (p. 19). This is usually carried out by stripping away the
basic human rights of a group of people, either by state or non-state actors. Genocide by attrition
is most closely associated with the slow process of genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. While
violent killings took place in the region before 2004, the violence since then has dwindled into
something just as purposeful but less direct (Rosenberg 2012).
In Darfur, genocide by attrition has been observed through the systematic destruction of
livestock and agriculture needed to sustain the tribal people. This destruction is a repeated
offense according to Eric Reeves (2005), who claims a faminine engineered by the central
government in Khartoum during 1998 in the southern Bahr el-Ghazal Province mimics more
recent events in Darfur (p. 21). The deaths of tribal people of Darfur cannot be considered a result
of war. These deaths directly correlate with famine and disease caused by policies engineered
by a regime with the intent to bring about the suffering of thousands. As of December 2004, more
than 150,000 have lost their lives to starvation or disease, and many more have been displaced
in the search for adequate food (Reeves, 2005). Throughout all this, the international community
was slow to act (with the African Union eventually sending 3,500 troops to monitor the situation)
(Reeves, 2005).
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Darfur is not the only example of genocide through attrition, but it is the most well known
and most explored example by scholars amongst the list of modern genocides. The example of
attrition is brought up in this paper because it is a relatively new area of interest in the field of
genocide studies, and has consequently not often been recognized as a form of genocide. It is
important that systems of prediction acknowledge the different forms and methods of
extermination to avoid missing cases where the process of genocide might not be clearly seen
(especially since genocide through attrition is often covered up by any state using it as their
method of mass killing). For this reason, it has been suggested as an indicator of ongoing
extermination.
Conclusion
Of all the Early Warning Systems in place for predicting the onset of genocide and
genocidal crimes, Dr. Stanton’s ten stages of genocide appears to be the most accurate. This is
in large part due not only to the descriptive nature of the model, but also to whom it is meant to
serve (the policymakers who have the power to advocate for the prevention of genocide). The
timeliness with which it is updated as well as the continued contribution of people witnessing
humanitarian crisis situations also lends it credibility where other systems are lacking. However,
Dr. Stanton’s system is not perfect, and it is important to acknowledge different strategies to
improve it so its predictive measures can be strengthened in the future.
To strengthen Professor Gregory Stanton’s Early Warning System further, one needs to
make it more descriptive than it already is so the stages of genocide can act as a guide for spotting
when and where genocide may be unfolding. By incorporating the concept of indicators from the
FAAC system into Dr. Stanton’s descriptive model, one can achieve a useful guide to spotting
what genocide might look like in various situations. The case studies mentioned previously in this
paper are an illustration of what these indicators could look like: past examples with specific points
of interest. By looking to past examples and trends in genocide, one can better spot the patterns
unfolding in the the present and future.
Predictive models may never be perfect. Even when they are created, they often go
unused or unnoticed by the international community. However, it is important to keep creating
and improving them with the hopes of creating a system with enough accuracy that it is impossible
to ignore. Until there is an Early Warning System strong enough to catch every warning of
genocide in enough time to enact meaningful prevention and intervention, those in the field of
genocide studies will be left repeating the mantra of “Never Again.”
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The Chicken Game and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis
Zhuoran Li, University of Virginia
Abstract
Game theory models have been applied to explain various Cold War crises. Scholars have
often utilized game theory models to study the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This thesis aims to
model the crisis bargaining process of the Sino-American conflict over Taiwan within a game
theory framework, arguing that the Chicken Game is the best available model to explain the 1958
Taiwan Strait Crisis. The principle of the Chicken Game asserts that while both players desire the
opponent to swerve and avoid the worst outcome of a total crash, neither player wants to swerve
and appear as a “chicken.” Both players can cooperate and swerve together, and then neither
side will lose face. However, lacking effective ways to communicate, both players fear that the
opponent might abandon cooperation. Therefore, both players are compelled to stay on course,
increasing the possibility of a crash; they hope that fear will force the opponent to swerve. If neither
player decides to swerve, then a crash, the worst outcome, is inevitable. In this paper, I introduce
four variables that can change the payoffs of the Chicken Game. By using these four variables, I
can evaluate the outcome of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. These four variables are military,
stake, ability to take damage, and status quo. The essay finds that the United States had an
advantage over China in three out of the four variables, and China only had advantage over the
U.S. in the ability to take damage. Therefore, the four variables of the Chicken Game can
successfully explain the result of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Introduction
In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling (1966) declares that “Cold War politics have
been linked, by Bertrand Russell and others, to the game of Chicken (p. 116).” The scenario for
the Chicken Game is quite simple. Two teenage boys, Adam, and Barry, both have a crush on
the school cheerleader Clara. Thus, they become increasingly hostile toward each other.
Therefore, they decide to settle this love dispute through a dangerous “Chicken Game.” This
game requires that both boys drive their car head-on toward each other on a narrow road. The
first person that turns away (swerves) will become the loser; the winner will have the opportunity
to ask Clara on a date. If both sides decide to swerve, then the game is nullified, and neither gets
the chance to ask Clara out. In this case, they return to the pre-game situation and have to find a
new way to solve this problem. If both Adam and Barry decide to continue driving, a car accident
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will happen. Thus, the game has four outcomes: Adam gets the date, Barry gets the date, neither
gets the date, and a car accident. Therefore, both Adam and Barry view dating Clara as the best
option and the car accident as the worst option. They also prefer that neither date Clara to the
other person dating Clara. Neither boy wants a car accident; however, both Adam and Barry want
to date Clara. Thus, they have to suppress their internal fear, continue driving, and become the
hero by forcing the other person to swerve.
The tragic paradox in this silly story is that if both players decide to continue driving and
wish the other player will turn away, then the car accident becomes inevitable. This tragic paradox
happens because the Chicken Game is a simultaneous game with uncertainty and
unpredictability. During the game, both players cannot predict the opponent’s action, so they
decide based on the perception of the opponent and the assessment of the situation. If the two
cars, instead of driving continuously, took turns advancing exactly fifty feet at a time toward each
other, a point would be reached when the next move will inevitably result in a collision. In this
case, the game loses its uncertainty; each player has the opportunity to take the appropriate steps
to avoid catastrophe.
This essay aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Chicken Game model over the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt and explain the American victory of the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis with the Chicken Game theory. In this essay, I introduce four strategic variables that are
pertinent to the crisis. Through the four variables, the essay can formalize our understanding of
the 1958 Crisis. Using the four variables also helps scholars to explore the results of varying
payoffs. These variables also illustrate the characteristics of the Chicken Game model. The four
strategic variables are the relative military power, the economic, strategic, and cultural stake for
each player, the ability to take damage from the opponent, and the status quo.
Literature Review
Scholars use game theory models to evaluate the crisis management process during the
1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis between China and the United States. Brett Benson of Vanderbilt
University and Emerson Niou of Duke University (2001) demonstrated the effectiveness of the
American strategic ambiguity policy towards the Taiwan Strait question during the 1958 Taiwan
Strait Crisis. Washington intentionally blurred the message to Beijing and Taipei to deter any effort
to change the status quo. In practice, the United States stood against the use of military force in
the Taiwan Strait while deterring Taiwan’s independence tendency (p. 2). Since President
Eisenhower viewed both Taiwan and Mainland China as potentially the first movers, the United
States had to achieve a dual deterrence objective. On the one hand, the United States needed to
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deter potential attacks from Mainland China. On the other hand, the United States needed to
prevent Taiwan’s military provocations that might cause China to launch a large-scale assault
against Taiwan. Through an extended deterrence model, Benson and Niou concluded that the
United States could not achieve double deterrence simultaneously by sending out a clear
message on the Taiwan Strait (p. 18). The United States could send out a statement to punish
the first player for provoking the other. However, such a statement would restrict the US’s range
of responses to unforeseeable circumstances or unexpected fluctuations in the status quo (p. 26).
The policy of strategic ambiguity ensured dual deterrence by increasing the cost for both Beijing
and Taipei for disturbing the current status quo and by reducing the possibility of excessive
commitment.
Reymond Franck and Francios Melese (2003) of the US Naval Postgraduate School
modeled the moves of China and the United States in game-theory terms and outlined seven
possible outcomes. They allowed both countries to be four possible types of players, with each
type corresponding to a distinct preference function. They concluded that China’s policy on
unification with Taiwan is a product of Chinese domestic politics (p. 15). When the Communist
Party feels secure and enjoys broad support, steady economic growth, and social stability, Beijing
is unlikely to take military action in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the United States has an interest
in providing a more secure international environment for Beijing (p. 17). Improving political and
economic relations with China will boost Beijing’s sense of security and reduce the possibility of
conflict.
In her game-theory analysis, Min Ye of Boston University (2007), unlike many other
scholars, focused on the interests of individual leaders, rather than states, as the unitary. She
combined the poliheuristic (PH) theory with game theory to evaluate the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis
and demonstrate the influence of domestic politics on Chinese decision makers. PH theory
focuses on the why and how of decision making. It explains the foreign policy decision making
process by combining rational choice and cognitive approaches in a systematic framework. In her
essay, she simplified policymaking into a two-stage process. In the first stage, leaders eliminated
irrational and impractical policy choices and reduced the complicated decision task to a set of
viable options. In the second stage, leaders made a rational choice based on maximizing benefit
and minimizing cost. Previous studies suggest that leaders evaluated their decisions based on
four dimensions: political, military, diplomatic, and economic (p. 4). Ye argues that in the 1958
Crisis, Chinese leaders valued domestic politics more than military, diplomatic, and economic
factors (p. 13). In 1958, a more manageable small-scale attack against the Jinmen Islands would
have been more beneficial for Beijing than an all-out bombardment in the military, diplomatic, and
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economic dimensions. However, Mao Zedong had an urgent need for domestic support for his
ambitious Great Leap Forward movement (p. 15). A military conflict against Taiwan would
mobilize the population and help Mao overcome the opposition within the Party (p. 16).
These three studies used game theory to guide their analyses of the Taiwan Strait
situation. Benson and Niou evaluated the effectiveness of the United States’ strategic ambiguity
approach toward China and Taiwan. Franck and Melese analyzed China’s foreign policies under
different international environments. Ye demonstrated the influence of domestic politics on the
Chinese decision-making process during both the 1958 and 1995-1996 Crises. These three
studies explained why Chinese and American leaders made certain decisions that caused the
Crisis to happen rather than crisis management processes. My research focuses on crisis
management and crisis bargaining between China and the United States during the 1958 Taiwan
Strait Crisis. My thesis studies how a specific game theory model, the Chicken Game, can explain
the bargaining process and the result of the 1958 Crisis, along with predicting the outcomes of
future crises.
The Four Variables in the Chicken Game
This section introduces the four variables in the Chicken Game. These four variables are
relative power, stake, the ability to take damage, and the status quo. In the traditional Chicken
Game, these four variables remain equal for both players. Alternatively, in this study, the four
variables are not constant for both players. So, this essay compares the relative values of these
four variables and explains the outcome of the 1958 Crisis.
The first variable is relative power: the comparison of the two players’ military power. The
term “relative” is of central importance: it is the comparison of military power. The more powerful
state is likely to stand firm. Meanwhile, the weaker side is likely to comply because it has a
profound incentive to avoid military conflict against a stronger enemy. Nuclear weapons
fundamentally changed the calculation of military force by increasing humans’ power of
destruction to an unprecedented level. Seemingly, the possession of nuclear weapons instantly
makes the player of the Chicken Game the more favorable side compared to the opponent who
does not possess nuclear weapons and increases the chance of successful military coercion.
Mutually assured destruction (MAD) happens when both states possess nuclear weapons; both
states could deter the opponent’s nuclear attack with the second-strike capability. Under MAD,
the direct exchange of nuclear weapons is highly unlikely. Therefore, leaders suppress their fear
and try to manipulate the opponent through nuclear brinkmanship, a strategy of threatening a
nuclear attack. However, it is difficult to succeed with nuclear brinkmanship. First, the cost of using
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nuclear weapons is high, so leaders face difficulty in signaling the credibility of nuclear
brinkmanship (Sechser 2017, p. 13). Second, psychological predispositions inhibit the use of risk
manipulation as a coercive strategy (p. 13). During crises, individuals are inclined to maximize
control and minimize random chance in decision making to avoid inadvertent wars (p. 53).
The second variable is the stake. Stake means how much each player values the
importance of the prize in the Chicken Game. If player A values the prize more than player B,
then A has greater incentive to obtain the prize than B. In the Chicken Game, A is more likely to
stand firm while B will swerve to avoid a meaningless conflict (Cashman 2014, p. 322). Besides,
since A has higher stakes than B and invests more into the prize than B, it will cost A more to give
up the prize. Players evaluate the stakes of the prize through many factors, including its strategic
value, resource value, and symbolic value. Strategic value is how the prize could enhance the
projection of the military power of a player. Resource value means the potential or actual material
gains for a player from the prize. The symbolic value ties to the culture and history of the player.
A player might view the prize as highly crucial because it plays a significant role in their history,
culture, or religion.
The third factor is the ability to take damage. The ability to take damage is a player’s
willingness and ability to make sacrifices for the prize. In the Chicken Game, the player who is
more able to take damage will stand firm while the player who is less able to take damage is more
likely to swerve. The ability to take a hit is only one side of the coin, however; the other side is the
ability to cause damage. A state might have a tremendous ability to take damage, but if it lacks
the ability to hit back, the aggressor will keep hitting the target state until it cannot take any more
damage.
The fourth and final factor is the status quo. Status quo means the player’s relationship
with the prize prior to the game. It is the default distribution of the prize before the game starts. In
a regular Chicken Game, the prize is openly contestable. In real-world cases, the prize may be
more closely affiliated with one player than the other. In these unusual situations, the player with
the status quo has more advantages than the opponent without it. As Robert Art (1993)
summarizes, deterrence has a higher chance of success than compellence (p. 7). The player who
owns the prize before the game starts practices deterrence in the Chicken Game, while the player
who tries to seize the prize must practice compellence. In terms of game theory payoffs, a player
who supports the status quo has a high incentive to stay cooperative.
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The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis
Summary:
On August 23, 1958, China launched a surprise artillery attack against the Jinmen Islands.
The Chinese military shelled 40,000 artillery shells onto these tiny islands. The next day, a
Chinese navy unit tried to capture the small Tungting Island near Jinmen and the Chinese
artilleries began to harass Nationalist supply ships in order to blockade the Islands (Sechser, p.
194). To address the blockade issue, the United States Navy began to escort Nationalist supply
ships to the Jinmen Islands. At the same time, the United States signaled its assertive position
and threatened to use nuclear weapons against China (p. 194).
As the military conflict continued, both countries started diplomatic maneuvers. The United
States and China resumed the Warsaw Talks-- a meeting between the ambassadors to Poland
from both China and the United States which was established in 1955 to resolve the issues in
Indochina- in September to negotiate the Taiwan Strait issue directly. The United States
attempted to end the crisis by pushing the demilitarization solution and forcing Taiwan to withdraw
from the Offshore Islands. In exchange, the United States would protect the islands against any
Communist assault. The Chinese side believed that as the tension continued, the United States
would force Taiwan to accept the demilitarization plan, which would create a de facto two-state
situation that would be unacceptable for Beijing. Thus, the Chinese leadership decided to deescalate the conflict. In October, Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai announced the suspension of
bombardment (p. 194). The United States received the suspension of attack warmly. The Navy
also froze the escort missions in exchange for the temporary cease-fire. The crisis gradually faded
away when China lifted the blockade in November.
Role of Taiwan
Before investigating the two players in the Sino-American Chicken Game, the role of
Taiwan during the 1958 Crisis will be evaluated. In the Chicken Game model, Taiwan is not
treated as an independent player because of its lack of power to pursue its interests. In the 1958
Crisis, Taiwan was not the pawn of the United States; it pursued independent interests that did
not align with the American policy, such as increasing American commitment to Taiwan’s security
and avoiding Washington-Beijing cooperation. However, it could not realize its interests outside
of the American constraints. Taiwan did not have sufficient military force to defend itself and had
no choice but to depend on the protection of the United States. The United States, on the other
hand, could disregard Taiwan’s interests and force its will through Taiwan’s opposition. Therefore,
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even though Taiwan had the interests to become an independent player, it was not treated as
such.
Military Analysis
The first factor in evaluating the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis under a Chicken Game model
is the comparison of military power between the United States and China. There was no question
that the United States, as one of the two superpowers in the world, had military superiority over
China. With the presence of the American aircraft carrier battle group, China’s People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) could not launch a successful campaign to capture the Jinmen Islands. The Chinese
leader also recognized this fact. In a Politburo meeting, Mao said that “we only have hand
grenades right now, not atomic bombs. Hand grenades could be successful for us to use in
beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against
Americans, who had nuclear weapons (Wu 1994, p. 5-11).” In addition, the United States was the
biggest nuclear power in the world, and China had not yet joined the nuclear club. However,
nuclear weapons did not play a significant role in the crisis. For the United States, nuclear
weaponry was militarily useful but politically costly.
Due to the mountainous geographic features of the Fujian Province, there was “no
satisfactory way to take out Communist guns by use of conventional weapons.(FRUS[1958-1960],
p. 27:204)” Only nuclear weapons could wipe out the PLA military installations. However,
American leaders clearly understood the political costs of using nuclear weapons. Dulles
estimated that the United States needed atomic weapons the same size as the bombs Americans
had used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to knock down PLA gun emplacements sufficiently. Such
weapons would certainly take the lives of millions of people (FRUS, p. 204). The goal of the United
States, according to President Eisenhower, was to generate international support for American
policy toward Taiwan (FRUS, p. 58.). The massive civilian death toll from nuclear weapons would
undoubtedly damage the international reputation of the United States.
American’s allies, most notably Great Britain, feared that if the United States used nuclear
weapons, “then the risks involved for all of us by a process of chain-reaction would be obvious
(FRUS, p. 80).” British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan pointed out that if the United States
attacked the Chinese air base, then the crisis could spiral into a nuclear world war (FRUS, p.80).
Furthermore, Macmillan pointed out that members of the British Commonwealth, such as India,
Australia, and New Zealand also opposed any American attack on Mainland China that could
escalate the danger (FRUS, p. 70). During the crisis, President Eisenhower and Secretary of
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State Dulles kept close interaction with the British government, demonstrating that the American
leaders valued the British opinion heavily and did not want to split with its allies.
The Soviet Union also clearly opposed any possibility of an American nuclear attack on
Mainland China. In a personal letter to Eisenhower, the Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev
claimed that Washington’s attempt to blackmail Beijing with nuclear weapons, “did not have and
could not have any success (FRUS, p. 74).” He further pointed out that, “in present conditions
when the USA has long not been the possessor of a monopoly in the field of atomic armaments,
attempts to intimidate other states by atomic weapons are a completely hopeless business
(FRUS, p. 74).” Finally, he declared that, “an attack on the Chinese People’s Republic, which is
a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union (FRUS, p. 74).”
This letter shows that the Soviet Union put the PRC under its nuclear umbrella; an American
atomic bombing on Mainland China would have led to a nuclear war. The Soviet nuclear umbrella
offset American nuclear supremacy.
A power comparison shows the American military advantage over China in 1958. The
United States had sufficient military power to defend the offshore islands with its aircraft carrier
battle groups. However, it failed to compel China with both conventional and nuclear weapons.
China, on the other hand, could deter American attack with Soviet nuclear umbrella. However, its
lacked sufficient military power to occupy the Islands.
American Stakes in Taiwan
Secretary of State Dulles compared the bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 to the Berlin
Blockade and concluded that the Taiwan Strait Crisis was a test of America’s commitment to the
Offshore Islands (FRUS, p.113). Therefore, American stakes in Taiwan and the Offshore Islands
were critical for the American East Asia policy. As this section shows, these stakes were incredibly
high for the United States.
Dulles believed that the loss of Taiwan would create a domino effect in the Asia-Pacific
region. In a letter to British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, Dulles explained that the loss of
Taiwan would certainly endanger the anti-Communist barrier and lead to the fall of numerous
American allies in East and Southeast Asia; it would endanger

Japan, South Korea, the

Philippines, Thailand, and many other American allies in the Western Pacific (FRUS, p. 69).The
Joint Resolution of Congress also authorized the president to use necessary military forces for
the protection of the Offshore Islands. It concluded that, “the secure possession by friendly
governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the
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vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean
(FRUS, p. 68).”
Therefore, defending the Offshore Islands became key to protecting Taiwan. Dulles
pointed out that the Islands were vital for the survival of the Republic of China (ROC) because
the loss of Jinmen would trigger the collapse of the regime (FRUS, p. 69). He further emphasized
that the United States would suffer a tremendous loss of confidence among its Asian allies if it
could not stand against Communist China in Jinmen (FRUS, p. 84) .Thus, the United States had
high stakes in defending both Taiwan and the Offshore Islands.
Chinese Stakes in the Offshore Islands and Taiwan
China had low stakes in the Offshore Islands. Mao believed the islands themselves
would have no utility for China. During a Politburo meeting, he told his colleagues, “for us, not
taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little impact on our construction of a socialist country. Jiang’s
troops on Jinmen-Mazu alone could not cause too much damage (Wu, p. 5-11).” He believed
that leaving the islands in the hands of Chiang would be more useful than seizing them. He
said, “If we [China] took over Jinmen-Mazu, or if we [China] allow the Americans to force
Jiang to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would lose a reliable means by which we can deal
with the Americans and Jiang (p. 5-11).”
Mao believed that the liberation of Taiwan was important. However, he understood
that this mission was difficult to achieve in 1958 due to the lack of military power. He admitted
that the Chinese Communists, “were unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain period (Wu,
p. 5-11).” Therefore, he did not see seizing Taiwan in 1958 as his priority. Mao’s true intention
was to mobilize the population for the Great Leap Forward through a controlled military
conflict. He said, “A tense situation can mobilize the population, can particularly mobilize the
backward people, can mobilize the people in the middle, and can, therefore, promote the
Great Leap Forward in economic construction (Central Party Literature Press[CPLP] 1994, p.
348-352).” Mao did not consider the unification of Taiwan when he ordered the attack; his
main objective was domestic mobilization.
The United States’ Ability to Take Damage
The United States showed a limited ability to take damage during the 1958 Crisis. Public
opinion constrained the President from hardline approaches. In a conversation between the
Department of State officials and military leaders, Dulles stated that, “much of the United States’
public sees the Offshore Island situation solely in terms of two very small islands a long way off
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which are not worth an atomic war. The people of the United States [were] not willing [to] support
a war-like effort by the United States government in this situation unless convinced of all
reasonable steps taken to try to avoid war (FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:116).” Therefore, public
opinion urged American decision makers to reduce the possibility of military conflict.
China’s Ability to Take Damage
China, on the other hand, demonstrated a strong ability to take damage. Mao was
known for his fearlessness against nuclear warfare (Renmin Chubanshe [RC], 1999). The 1958
Taiwan Strait Crisis tested Mao’s nuclear philosophy. Mao had a contradictory view on the loss
of human life. On the one hand, he showed concerns about the massive loss of population,
saying “A war of atomic and hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since many people will die.
That is why we oppose a war (CPLP 1994, p. 348-352).” On the other hand, he downplayed the
tragic effect of a nuclear war. He told other Politburo members: “I am saying that it is not so
terrifying even if half of our population perishes. This is certainly talk in extreme terms. Thinking
about the history of the entire universe, I do not see any reason to be pessimistic about the
future. If the nuclear war eliminates a government, then “the people would form another one
which could work out a peace (CPLP 1994, p 348-352).”
To unpack Mao’s philosophical view on the disastrous outcome of a nuclear war, one must
understand Mao’s understanding of the nature of nuclear wars. Mao clearly believed that the
nuclear war was an imperialistic war. China did not have the power to decide whether a nuclear
war would happen. If nuclear war had broken out, the imperialists would be the aggressors (CPLP
1994, p. 348-352). Therefore, under such a situation, China would have no choice but to fight this
undesired war.
What is behind Mao’s nuclear philosophy was Mao’s nuclear bargaining strategy under
Chicken Game conditions. Mao clearly understood that the United States must bear a tremendous
cost for launching a nuclear war. He said that the United States would face, “an issue of popularity”
and receive little international support if it launched a nuclear attack on China (CPLP 1994, p.
348-352). China would lose millions of people in a nuclear war. However, China was the most
populous country in the world, and Chinese leaders had long viewed China’s massive population
as its biggest strength. When China disregarded the loss of human life, American nuclear
supremacy would be nullified. While the cost of a nuclear war would be tremendous for the United
States, in the mind of Mao, the cost of a nuclear war would be minuscule for China. With such
thinking, China would achieve a mental parity with the United States under nuclear inferiority.
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Status Quo
In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling (1966) argues that deterrence is more credible
than compellence (p. 73). The message of deterrence is clearer than the message of
compellence. If the adversary cannot understand the vague objective of compellence, then it is
less likely to do what it is being told. Art agreed with the conclusion of Schelling, but with a new
set of reasoning. A compelled state suffers more humiliation than a deterred state; compellence
requires a state to give up already acquired interests in responding to a force from another state
(Art and Waltz 1993, p. 7). This is not the case for deterrence. Deterrence demands that a state
gives up interests that it has not yet acquired (p. 7).Therefore, giving up something a state has
not gained is undoubtedly easier and less humiliating than abandoning what it has already
received.
The status quo was more favorable to the United States during the 1958 Crisis. The United
States, as the defender, was on the deterrence side, while China, the aggressor, had a
compellence objective. Thus, a return to the status quo means the success of American
deterrence and the failure of Chinese compellence. As a result, it is more likely for the United
States to practice hardline policy rather than swerving because it has a higher chance of success.
As for China, it is more likely to swerve because hardline policy would inevitably lead to war.
Furthermore, the United States could reshape the status quo, and China could not. During
the crisis, the United States demonstrated that it could move the pre-crisis status quo to a situation
more unfavorable to China if China did not accept the pre-crisis status quo. Therefore, China was
forced to take the less-preferred option, and reluctantly agreed to return to the pre-crisis status
quo.
After China initiated the bombardment on August 23, tensions escalated quickly. On
September 4, Dulles issued a nuclear warning in which he declared that the United States would
defend the Jinmen and Mazu Islands by any means necessary (FRUS [1958-1960], p. 27:68).
However, the Chinese side was unresponsive toward the American atomic threat. Mao did not
discuss questions of nuclear weapons in any Politburo meetings. The behavior of the Chinese
military also suggests that the nuclear threat did not drive Mao’s calculations. China’s most
aggressive shelling occurred on September 8, when the PLA fired 53,310 shells, and on
September 11, when it fired over 60,000 shells (Sechser, p. 199).
The Chinese side made a first attempt that seemed like an effort to de-escalate. On
September 6, Premier Zhou En-lai issued a statement that said, “To make a further effort to
safeguard peace, the Chinese Government is prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks
between the two countries (FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:71).” The United States received this
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proposal warmly, and the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks resumed at Warsaw on
September 13 (FRUS, p. 71). However, the Warsaw Talks were not a Chinese effort to deescalate. Mao viewed the strategic objective of the Warsaw Talks as a way to, “employ diplomatic
means to coordinate our fighting on the Fujian front (Wu, p. 5-11).” Therefore, the Chinese side
took an aggressive negotiation position during the Warsaw Talks and refused to make any
concession.
It was the Dulles Speech on September 30 that opened the possibility for de-escalation.
In the speech, Dulles proposed the mutual renunciation of force by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
He argued that, “this would be a fair arrangement, and it would be wrong to ask the Reds along
to renounce force.” He said: “If there is a dependable ceasefire in the Formosa area, the United
States will favor withdrawal of at least some of the large Chinese Nationalist force on the Offshore
Islands (Newark Advocate, 1958).”
The Chinese leaders were alarmed by Dulles’s proposal of the mutual renunciation of
force by Beijing and Taipei and the possibility of demilitarizing the Offshore Islands. During the
Politburo meeting on October 4, Zhou En-lai pointed out that “Dulles’s speech indicated America’s
intention to seize this opportunity to create two Chinas (CPLP 1994, p. 348-352).” The CCP
leaders could not accept this change of the status quo. They believed that Taiwan was part of
China, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis was China’s internal affairs. Therefore, as Zhou Enlai
explained to Soviet representative S.F. Antonov, China could not “trade a settlement of JinmenMazu for recognition of America’s occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and acceptance of the
existence of so-called ‘two Chinas’ (CPLP 1990, p. 262-267).”
Mao understood that the intensive bombardment against the Jinmen and Mazu Islands
pressured the United States to pursue the demilitarization plan. He believed that Chiang wanted
to hold the Offshore Islands. However, the attack would give the United States leverage to
pressure Chiang to give up those islands (Wu, p. 5-11). Thus, China should help Chiang resist
American pressure by de-escalating the tension, and the ROC leaders could, therefore, “drive a
hard bargain with America (Wu, p. 5-11).” Hence, Mao proposed to leave Jinmen and Mazu in
the hands of Chiang (Wu, p. 5-11). He explained his decision during a Politburo meeting: “The
advantage of this policy was that we could maintain contact with the Nationalists through this
channel since these islands were very close to Mainland China (Wu, p. 5-11).”
At the end of this meeting, Mao concluded that China would lower the intensity of the
bombardment. After the meeting, Mao issued an order to immediately suspend the shelling for
two days (Wu, p. 5-11). On October 6, Mao published, “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan”
in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. In the message, Mao suggested that Chiang should
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resist American pressure and abandon the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. Mao
also offered an opportunity for cross-Strait negotiations. Furthermore, the message announced
the PLA would further suspend the shelling for another seven days. Within this period, the
Nationalists navy would “be fully free to ship in supplies on condition that there be no American
escort (FRUS [1958-1960], p. 27:156).”
The United States received this ceasefire from Beijing positively and agreed to suspend
the escort mission. After the first ceasefire expired, China extended the decision to continue the
ceasefire for another two weeks. The United States welcomed the extension. Dulles compared
the situation of the Offshore Islands with the Berlin Blockade and thought the extension of the
ceasefire would lead to the de-escalation of the Taiwan Strait (FRUS [1958-1960], p. 27:177).
After the additional two weeks of the ceasefire, China took another approach of de-escalation.
Mao extended the no shelling policy to odd days, so the Nationalists troops could resupply and
“get some sunshine” on even days. The purpose of this new strategy was to ensure Chiang’s
force could maintain their position on the islands (CPLP 1992, p. 437). As China moved away
from the blockade, the Crisis officially ended on October 25.
As the historical documents have shown, in the case of the 1958 Crisis, the fear of
changing the status quo against its favor drove China to de-escalate. China initially wanted to
change the status to its favor by occupying the Offshore Islands. However, facing the
overwhelming American military force, China realized that it could not change the status quo as
it wanted. On the other hand, Beijing could not accept a permanent two-China solution to the
Taiwan Strait problem. Mao realized that by pressuring the Offshore Islands aggressively, China
allowed the United States to create two-China. The military pressure from China gave the United
States leverage over Taiwan, and the US could use the bombardment to persuade Chiang to
accept the demilitarization plan. Therefore, China’s assault could have helped the United States
to move the status quo of the Taiwan Strait toward a two-China solution. Thus, Mao decided to
de-escalate and continue the current status quo; he considered return to the pre-crisis status quo
as a preferable outcome to the demilitarization plan. The United States was on the deterrence
side of the status quo, so it needed to stay firm and not swerve. The demilitarization plan
demonstrated that the United States forced China to swerve by increasing the cost China would
suffer if it did not swerve.
Theoretical Findings
Game theory is a branch of mathematics concerned with decision making in social
interactions. It applies to situations (games) where there are two or more people (called players),

33

The Chicken Game and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

where each attempt to choose between two or more ways of acting (called strategies). The
possible outcomes of a game depend on the choices made by all the players and can be ranked
in order of preference by each player (Brams, 2001). In a two-player game theory model, the
preference of each player is recorded as cooperation (C) or defection (D). Therefore, there are a
total of four possible outcomes: A forces down B (CD), B forces down A (DC), cooperation (CC),
and war (DD). This section will explain why the Chicken Game model best explains the Taiwan
Strait Crisis.
In game theory, the Chicken Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Stag Hunt are the three
models that have been widely discussed by international relations theorists. These game theory
models share a critical assumption. Each player makes a decision independently, and during the
decision-making, no player can communicate with the other. If two players can communicate and
coordinate their interests, then they will choose the best outcome every time and game theory
models lose their purpose. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, the police arrest and interrogate two criminals.
If one remains silent and the other cooperates with the police, the cooperator will be set free while
the silent partner will suffer extra-harsh punishment. If they both cooperate with the police, then
they both receive regular punishment. If they both remain silent, then they both receive light
punishment. This model shows why two rational players fail to cooperate despite cooperation,
serving their best interests (Oye 1985, p. 1-24). In Stag Hunt scenario, a group of hunters is
hunting for a stag while a hare comes into sight. Everyone must act together to hunt the stag, and
once the stag is killed, everyone can share the meat of the stag. If one hunter targets the hare,
the stag hunt will fail, but he will have the hare. If everyone targets the hare, then everyone will
share the hare’s meat. The Stag Hunt model demonstrates why cooperation serves the best
interests of both parties (p. 1-24). Kenneth Oye (1985) compared and contrasted the three game
theory models to identify the different preferences among each player in the three models. In the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player prefers DC > CC > DD > CD; in the Chicken Game, each player
prefers DC > CC > CD > DD; in the Stag Hunt, each player prefers CC > DC > DD > CD (p. 124).
In the Stag Hunt model, cooperation is the best option for both players. However, neither
party considered cooperation during the 1958 Crisis. On the one hand, the American leadership
escalated the conflict by issuing nuclear threats at the beginning of the Crisis. This confrontational
American position was in alignment with the massive retaliation policy that was widely practiced
during the Eisenhower Administration. According to the massive retaliation policy, the United
States would meet any military challenge with the threat of using nuclear force (Dulles, 1954).
This policy aimed to deter any attack, but it would also drastically escalate any minor conflict into
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a possible world war. Later in the Crisis, when American leadership was ready to resolve the
conflict through negotiation, the Chinese leaders rejected any form of cooperation during the
Warsaw Talks. The Chinese representative Wang Bingnan rejected the American ceasefire
proposal and declared that “ the question of a ceasefire does not arise” because the bombardment
was part of the Chinese Civil War, not a conflict between China and the United States
(FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:93) . One example that illustrates the lack of cooperative spirit between
China and the United States during the Warsaw Talks was that the two sides could not agree on
the location of the first formal meeting (FRUS, p. 87). The lack of cooperation demonstrates that
neither side viewed mutual cooperation as the best option to resolve the crisis. Thus, it does not
fit into the Stag Hunt model.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both players preferred war over a concession. However, during
the 1958 Crisis, both sides tried to avoid war. The United States faced anti-war pressures from
allies, the Soviet Union, and even its own public. Therefore, the American leadership was unlikely
to launch a war that might cause domestic opposition, a split with its allies, and possibly World
War III. As a result, the president demanded a peaceful way out of the Jinmen problem (FRUS,
p. 75). He saw the Warsaw Talk as an opportunity to negotiate a ceasefire in good faith (FRUS,
p. 75). Similarly, the Chinese leaders did not seek to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war.
The primary concern of the Chinese leadership in the fall of 1958 was the Great Leap Forward.
Mao wanted a manageable conflict for domestic mobilization. He clearly did not want a war that
might jeopardize the ongoing political movement or the construction of Socialism. Therefore,
during the bombardment, Mao specifically ordered the avoidance of shelling American escort
ships, which might cause American deaths and drag the United States to war (Dai 2007, p. 355).
Neither side preferred war, and both sides actively avoided this even after realizing that
cooperation was impossible. Therefore, the Prisoner’s Dilemmas is not a good explanation of the
1958 Crisis.
The Chicken Game is the most effective model to describe the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The
Chicken Game model shows that each player prefers forcing the opponent to swerve the most
and war the least. At the beginning of the crisis, both sides wanted to force the opponent to
swerve. The United States issued a nuclear threat to demonstrate its overwhelming power to
China. China, in return, blockaded the Jinmen-Mazu Islands to test the American resolve. As the
crisis continued, both China and the United States realized that the opponent was unlikely to
swerve. Without swerving, a war would become inevitable. Therefore, both sides actively avoided
war, and China eventually chose concession and returned to the pre-Crisis status over launching
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an attack. Both players’ preferences show that the Chicken Game is the best model to explain
the 1958 Crisis.
The four variables of the Chicken Game effectively explain the outcome of the 1958
Taiwan Strait Crisis. The United States was clearly the stronger military power, but its military
force was unable to coerce China. The United States had a higher stake over Taiwan. China had
a high ability to take damage while the US’ ability to take damage was low. The United States had
the advantage of the status quo because it was the deterrence side while China was on
compellence. Among the four variables, the United States had an advantage over China in three:
military, stakes, and status quo. China had an advantage over the United States in its ability to
take damage. Therefore, the four variables successfully demonstrate China’s overall
disadvantage and lead to the conclusion that China was likely to swerve. As the analysis shows,
China eventually backed down from the Crisis.
Many believe that the military power is the most important variable in a Chicken Game,
however, the American military advantage played a limited role in the 1958 Crisis because both
sides could deter the opponent, yet lacked the necessary power of compellence. Therefore,
neither side could coerce the other with credibility. The United States indeed had a more powerful
military, but its military advantage could not translate into compellence power because it lacked
effective conventional weapons that could be used on Chinese airports and gun fields; in addition,
there were tremendous political costs of using nuclear weapons. China’s military inferiority was
supplemented by its alliance with the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union would only act on
its commitment to China when China was attacked; it would refrain from getting involved when
China was the aggressor. Therefore, China could use the Soviet power in deterrence, but still
faces military inferiority in compellence. As a result, lack of compellence power minimized the role
of military power in the 1958 Crisis.
It is important to note that the status quo was the most important variable in deciding the
outcome of the Taiwan Strait Crisis. When neither lacked the power of compellence, China’s
position as compellence put itself at a natural disadvantage. China’s decision of ceasefire was
not a product of American military superiority; the American nuclear threat did not influence
China’s decision making. China viewed the American attempt to move the status quo through the
demilitarization plan as unacceptable. The Chinese leaders could not accept the two-state
solution under the new reality. Therefore, facing the difficult choice between old and new status
quos, Beijing was forced to swerve and accept the return to the old norm.
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Conclusion
This essay demonstrates that the Chicken Game was the most effective game theory
model available to evaluate the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Through detailed empirical analysis, it
shows that the other models, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, had shortcomings. The lack of
cooperation between China and the United States runs counter to the cooperate-first mentality of
the Stag Hunt model. The massive cost of war made both Chinese and American leaders realize
that war was their last option, and China’s decision to swerve rather than go to war contradicts
the Prisoner’s Dilemma model.
The essay also introduces four variables of the Chicken Game that successfully explain
the outcome of the Crisis. These four variables are military power, stake, ability to take damage,
and status quo. These variables have critical future implications; they can be applied to project
the outcome of any future two-party Chicken Game crisis. The pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen defended her presidency in the 2020 Taiwan election.
While she pushes for her independence agenda, a new Taiwan Strait Crisis may occur in the next
several years. As the American military superiority over China has shrunk to near parity and the
American stake in Taiwan has declined significantly, the United States may need to admit its
weakness and swerve to Chinese pressure.
Bibliography
American Sources:
Acheson, Dean. “Speech on the Far East.” Speech, National Press Club, Washington DC,
January 12, 1950.
Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
American Institute in Taiwan. “Taiwan Relations Act.” Accessed March 13, 2019.
https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documentsregion/taiwan-relations-act/.
Brams, Steven J. “Game Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Plus Magazine (2001).
Cashman, Greg. What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014.
Copper, John F. Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Westport:
Praeger Security International, 2016.
Editorial. Newark Advocate. September 30.

37

The Chicken Game and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

Editorial. Oxnard Press Courier. September 30, 1958.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX, eds. Harriet Dashiell
Schwar and Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1996)
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981.
Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York, NY: Random House,
1988.
Liu, Xinsheng. "Dimension Manipulation and Choice Strategy in US-China Relations: A Spatial
Game-theoretical Analysis." Journal of Chinese Political Science 3, no. 2 (1997): 1-23.
Niou, Emerson M.S., and Brett V. Benson. "Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity: US Security
Commitment to Taiwan." http://people.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/strategic ambiguity.pdf.
Office of the Historian, Department of State. “The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué on
Arms Sales to Taiwan.” Accessed March 16, 2018.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/china-communique.
Office of the United States Trade Representative. “The People's Republic of China.” Accessed
November 10, 2018. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoplesrepublic-china.
Oye, Kenneth A. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." World
Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1-24.
Raymond Franck & Francois Melese (2003). “A Game Theory View of Military Conflict in the
Taiwan Strait.” Defense & Security Analysis, 19:4, 327-348.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.
Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984):
461-95.
United States. Dept. of State. Historical Office., United States. Dept. of State. Historical Division.
(1959-1969). American foreign policy, current documents. Washington, D.C.: Historical
Division, Bureau of Public Affairs.
Wu, Xinbo. “Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States.”
United States Institution of Peace. April, 2018.
Ye, Min. "Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision Making." Foreign Policy Analysis
3, no. 4 (2007): 317-44.

38

Zhuoran Li

Chinese Sources:
Dai, Chaowu. Age of Hostility and Crisis: Sino-American Relations From 1954-1958.
Beijing, China: Social Science Archive Publishing House, 2007.
"Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai," October 05, 1958, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed.,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of
the People’s Republic of China), vol. 7 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992),
437. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117019
"Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng," October 31, 1958, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed.,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of
the People’s Republic of China), vol. 7 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992),
479. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117024
"Mao Zedong, 'Speech at a Meeting of the Representatives of Sixty-four Communist and
Workers' Parties' (Edited by Mao)," November 18, 1957, History and Public Policy
Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong wenji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 7
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999). English translation from Michael Schoenhals, "Mao
Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 ‘Moscow Conference’," Journal of Communist Studies 2,
no. 2 (1986): 109-126. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121559
"Meeting Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Conversation with S.F. Antonov on the Taiwan Issue (excerpt),"
October 05, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai waijiao
wenxuan (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian
chubanshe, 1990), 262-267. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117018
"Memoir by Wu Lengxi, 'Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen' ,"
August 23, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhuanji wenxue
(Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994: 5-11
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117009.
"Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),"
September 05, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong
waijiao wenxuan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhongyang
wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 341-348.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117013

39

The Chicken Game and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

Wang, Bingnan. Memoir of Nine-year Sino-American Negotiations Beijing, China: World
Knowledge Publishing House, 1985.
Zhou Enlai. “The Liberation of Taiwan Will Come True.” Speech, National People’s Congress,
Beijing, June 28, 1956.

40

The Ramerican Political Science Review, Volume 5, 2020
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Abstract
This paper offers insight on two theories that explain the election of President Donald J.
Trump in the 2016 United States presidential election. The election of Trump is considered one
of the greatest electoral upsets in U.S. history: the last round of public polling preceding Election
Day overwhelmingly favored Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, with an edge of as much as
seven percentage points (Mercer et. al 2016). However, the explanations as to what propelled
Trump into the Oval Office are numerous. One theory explores the significance of the vice
presidential nominees as they pertain to the Democratic and Republican tickets. Because
American voters had to choose between two of the most unpopular presidential candidates in
United States history, many voters carefully examined their respective running mates. This trend
becomes especially notable in the Midwest and the Rust Belt, as the Trump-Pence ticket carried
states that have traditionally voted Democratic (Lai and Parlapiano 2016). The second theory
concentrates on the role of the Vice President, Mike Pence. Pence appeared to play an integral
role in the electoral success of Trump: not only did Pence deliver his home state of Indiana, but
the ticket was also able to secure a majority of the Midwest region of the country. Moreover, the
historic levels of mass mobilization among Evangelicals who voted for Trump can be attributed to
Pence, a staunch Evangelical himself. Shifting focus towards the impact of vice presidential
choice and the role of Pence could shed light on the historic election that caught much of the
country off guard.
Heightened Emphasis on the VP: Inside the Mindset of the American Voter
Trump and Clinton were considered by many individuals as the most unpopular, polarizing
candidates to win their respective party’s nominations. In fact, they were historically unpopular:
according to a Gallup poll, both candidates faced “the worst election-eve images of any majorparty presidential candidates,” as Trump earned a record 62% unfavorability rating, followed by
Clinton’s 52% unfavorability rating (Saad 2016). Trump was largely criticized for comments he
made on the campaign, as they were lambasted as “sexist, racist, insulting, and offensive” (Wilson
2017, 235). Trump’s character repeatedly came into question, as demonstrated by his verbal
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attack on a Gold Star father, his failure to immediately denounce Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke,
and the leaked “Access Hollywood” tape in which Trump bragged about being able to “do
anything” with women (Haberman and Oppel Jr. 2016; Chan 2016; Farenthold 2016).
Consequently, an overwhelming majority of polls predicted a resounding victory for Clinton
(“Election 2016 - General Election”). Trump’s chances of winning the general election were so
low that a GOP insider claimed “it would take video evidence of a smiling Hillary drowning a litter
of puppies while terrorists surrounded her with chants of ‘Death to America’” for Trump to achieve
victory (Shepard 2016). Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric projected an unfavorable image of himself
and the Republican Party to the American public.
Meanwhile, the Democratic side presented its own problems. Clinton, the presumptive
Democratic nominee, faced little competition in the Democratic primary. The only real challenge
to Clinton was Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, yet Clinton was able to maintain her lead in
delegates until she finally won the party’s nomination. However, details soon emerged of a
“rigged” Democratic primary in favor of Clinton, as emails were released showing a “web of
collusion” between Clinton’s campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and mainstream
media outlets (Christiansen 2018, 199). This revelation exacerbated the “corrupt” label that
Clinton was trying to shake off throughout the campaign. A good number of Americans believed
she was an “economic elitist out of touch with average Americans,” especially after she made the
remark that Trump supporters were a “basket full of deplorables” (Clinton 2017, 44, 47). Perhaps
the most damaging feature of the Democratic nominee was Clinton’s use of a private email
account on secure federal servers from 2009-2013 during her tenure as Secretary of State under
the administration of President Barack Obama. These emails, some containing classified
information, came to the forefront of the campaign eleven days before the election as the FBI
announced it was examining newly discovered emails sent or received by Clinton (Zurcher 2016).
In fact, Clinton’s shady history earned her the infamous nickname “Crooked Hillary” by Trump on
the campaign trail (Geir 2016). As a result, Clinton was unable to escape the “corrupt” label that
many associated her candidacy with.
The extreme unattractiveness of both candidates put the American electorate in a
significant bind. Trump’s divisive rhetoric versus Clinton’s questionable political history
established an election in which many voters viewed their vote as choosing between the “lesser
of two evils” (Delkic 2016). A Pew study discovered that a voter’s dislike of the opponent was
influential in their support for a particular candidate (“In Their Own Words”). Given this prevailing
sentiment, Americans casting their ballots decided to place greater emphasis on analyzing the
presidential ticket. As a result, the 2016 election was subject to an unprecedented phenomenon
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in American electoral history: voters selected their president based on the strength of the
presidential ticket, not the candidates themselves. In other words, the credentials of the vice
presidential nominees determined the outcome of the 2016 election. Before assessing the
background of both nominees to understand how they impacted their respective tickets, it is
imperative to assess the history of vice presidential selections, as well as the impact of such
selections on U.S. presidential elections.
VP Selection: An Analysis of Variables
Since 1940, conventions have no longer served as the means for selecting running mates,
as presidential candidates and their advisors have been given autonomy in the process (Black
2016). Baumgartner (2008) constructed a model that illustrated the factors and their relative
salience that presidential candidates consider when they construct a presidential ticket. Such
variables include, but are not limited to: regional balance, demographic balance, and ideological
balance (767). With regards to regional balance, a separate model focused on predictors of
candidates’ state vote percentages from 1932-2000 discovered that vice presidential candidates
received a 3% boost in their home states and fared better in their home regions (Powell 2004,
125). Therefore, geography is a prominent theme in the makeup of the ticket. Furthermore, the
study found that a distinction exists between the electoral impacts of Democrat and Republican
running mates: Democrat vice presidential candidates provide a home-state advantage, while
their Republican counterparts enjoy an electoral boost not only in their home states, but in their
regions as well (Powell 2004, 128). However, the “balancing” of tickets does not necessarily
translate to electoral gains or victory. Adkison (1982) separated positive and negative feelings
towards presidential and vice presidential candidates to highlight that people tend to vote against
the vice president, contributing to the claim that vice presidents hurt the ticket more than they help
it (333). After reviewing extant literature on the subject, Uscinski (2012) concluded that the vice
presidential candidate has little, if any, influence over the general election outcome (61). A
separate research design evaluating the impact of vice presidential selection on voter choice
found that there was a small likelihood that supporting a presidential candidate corresponded to
one’s vice presidential preference (Grofman and Kline 2010, 308). Although vice presidential
nominees may offer electoral gains in certain states, their overall effect on voter choice is deemed
negligible by many.
The 2008 presidential election appeared to challenge this notion. The 2008 general
election provided an interesting case in which vice presidential candidates could have played an
integral role in the outcome. More specifically, the pairing of Arizona Senator John McCain and
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Alaska Governor Sarah Palin for the Republican ticket highlighted a ticket where the VP nominee
was influencing how voters perceived the presidential candidate (Steinhauser 2008). According
to the aforementioned variables that influence the VP selection process, the pairing makes
geographical sense, as Palin secured Alaska, which was expected to be fiercely contested in the
general election. Moreover, Palin provided an ideological balance to the ticket, as McCain
represented the moderate faction of the party. Palin’s role was to shore up conservative support
and rally voters behind McCain, whose relations with the far-right wing of the Republican Party
“had been strained for much of his political career” (Cohen 2010, 205). However, Palin was an
outsider with no real political experience in the nation’s capital, and she was heavily inexperienced
with only two years as governor under her belt. In addition, she was viewed as a divisive and
polarizing figure: Knuckey (2012) documents that roughly 34% of voters felt “cold” towards Palin
on a “feeling thermometer,” a threshold that few vice presidential candidates have reached (277).
Knuckey studied the “Palin Effect” and discovered that moderate and independent voters who felt
cold towards Palin were less likely to cast a vote for McCain. Furthermore, the effect Palin had on
voter choice was the most significant of any vice presidential candidate since 1980 (284). Elis,
Hillygus, and Nie (2010) found that Palin’s “declining favorability cost McCain 1.6 percentage
points on Election Day” (8). Brox and Cassels (2009) and Ulbig (2010) further substantiated the
existence of a “Palin Effect” that impacted the 2008 election (as cited in Knuckey 2013, 961).
Therefore, vice presidential nominees possess the potential to impact the outcome of a general
election, as explicitly expressed by the results of an election eight years prior to 2016.
The VP Factor: How the Republican Ticket Prevailed over the Democratic Ticket
With the importance of vice presidential nominees in mind, it is necessary to discuss the
background of both nominees in the 2016 election. The Republican vice presidential nominee to
run alongside Trump was then-Indiana Governor Pence. Pence had served six terms in the House
of Representatives from 2001-2013 before being elected as Indiana’s governor in 2012. During
his tenure in the House, Pence rose up the Republican ranks, eventually securing the House
Republican Conference Chair in 2009. Pence had a plethora of relationships with members of
Congress, most notably the “grass-roots Tea Party wing of the party” (“Donald Trump Chooses
Mike”). Despite the unfavorability of Trump, conservatives held Pence in high regard for his
leadership of the “conservative movement in Washington” (Nussbaum 2016). Because Pence
had a keen understanding of governing from the nation’s capital, the Republican ticket attained
an outsider-insider balance. Pence offered regional balance to the ticket, as the Midwest
represented an electorally-valuable region with the key swing states of Iowa, Ohio, and
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Wisconsin. Pence’s state of Indiana was not considered to be a contest, as Republican candidate
Mitt Romney carried the state by ten points in 2012. Indiana was one of the few states from the
Midwest to vote Republican that year (Leip). Pence, a Reagan-like conservative, also brought
ideological balance to the ticket (J. Graham 2017). FiveThirtyEight—a data analysis website that
measures various political variables—conducted a projection model to measure the ideological
orientation of Pence and former vice presidential nominees. Pence received an average score of
sixty, making him the most conservative vice presidential nominee in the model’s database (Enten
2016). Although Pence did not provide racial or ethnic balance to the ticket, his standing as an
Evangelical gave some semblance of a religious quality to the ticket and attracted Evangelical
voters.
Clinton’s running mate, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine, was picked nearly a week after Trump’s
selection of Pence (Karni 2016). Kaine was a former Governor of Virginia from 2006-2010 and
had been serving in the U.S. Senate since 2013 (Hopper 2016). With political involvement at the
local, state, and federal levels, Kaine offered more insider experience to the Democratic ticket.
The selection of Kaine carried the semblance of a regional balance. His state of Virginia was a
battleground state in the 2016 election, and a blue Virginia could influence the winner of other
southern states, especially North Carolina, a state that Romney had won by just two percentage
points in 2012 (Leip). As a moderate Democrat, Kaine did not provide an ideological balance to
the Democratic ticket, which exacerbated the bitterness shared by the left wing of the Democratic
Party and other voters who supported Sanders in the primary. Kaine’s record did nothing to
assuage these voters' concerns about voting for the candidate that “cheated” them in the
Democratic primary. Kaine was a candidate who could appeal to the Hispanic and Latino
constituencies in the country: in 2013 Kaine delivered a speech on the senate floor entirely in
Spanish, the first of its kind (Matthews 2016). However, although he is Roman Catholic and
speaks fluent Spanish, the Virginian senator did not deliver any demographic balance.
These unique attributes, intended to resonate with certain constituencies in the country,
were reinforced during the 2016 Vice Presidential debate. The Vice Presidential debate provides
a platform in which the vice presidential nominees showcase these personal traits, as well as
influence public opinion on the presidential tickets. Because of the nature of the 2016 presidential
candidates, the running mates were asked to make a strong case for their respective tickets,
rather than for the presidential candidates, to the American people. The debate consisted of back
and forth dialogue between Kaine and Pence, both lambasting the other side while praising their
own. Kaine was very aggressive during the full ninety minutes, frequently interrupting Pence on
a number of issues and exploiting comments made by Trump. He made strides to portray Clinton’s
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career in a positive light, highlighting her time as Secretary of State under the Obama
administration. Kaine also highlighted his history as a public servant. It was a solid performance
by Kaine, especially as he went on the offensive, forcing Pence to defend Trump’s comments on
immigration, releasing his taxes, and other issues. Yet, Pence was cool, calm, and collected
throughout the debate as he carefully conveyed the message of the Republican ticket. The
constituencies that Pence underscored during this debate are notable: he illustrated his
upbringing in small-town America, cited the “War on Coal,” and emphasized the sanctity of life.
Each of these issues appeared to target the Midwest and Rust Belt demographics. Pence
attributed the decay of these regions to the Obama administration. Where Kaine indicated that
Trump was a dangerous choice for America, Pence countered that a Clinton presidency would be
a continuation of the Obama administration (POLITICO Staff 2016). Pence also did not interrupt
as much as Kaine did, which in turn affected how favorably voters felt towards Pence. A poll
released by POLITICO soon after the debate reflected this sentiment: 38% of registered voters
believed Pence won the debate, while just 20% thought Kaine had won (Reid 2016).
After assessing the attributes of each vice presidential nominee, one can look to the results
of the 2016 election to see their impact. The aforementioned constituencies that Pence
highlighted during the debate delivered victories for Trump in a majority of the Midwest and the
Rust Belt. Pennsylvania—another battleground state—and Michigan went red for the first time
since 1988. Kaine, on the other hand, appeared to deliver no major constituencies other than his
state. In fact, Kaine’s value to the ticket comes into serious question after looking at the results in
Virginia: Clinton did not even secure 50% of the state vote. Obama, who did not have a Virginian
as his running mate, won the state with 53% of the vote in 2008 and 51% of the vote in 2012
(Leip). As a result, Kaine did not appear to provide a significant electoral advantage for Clinton.
Furthermore, Trump’s victories in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin can largely
be attributed to a ticket that included a small-town American who grew up with “corn fields in his
backyard” (Politico Staff 2016). Pence resonated with these voters, unlike Kaine. Therefore, the
ticket that consisted of an outsider and a small-town America governor prevailed over the ticket
with two Washington insiders.
What Clinton may have failed to realize was that her reputation was already on thin ice
among voters who supported Sanders during the “rigged” Democratic primary. Instead of picking
a running mate that could alleviate their concerns and repair the relationship with some of these
voters, she settled for Kaine. This ultimately spelled disaster for the Democratic ticket: Wisconsin
and Michigan, states that Sanders had won in the Democratic primary, went to Trump. As a
precursor, both of these states had not voted Republican since the 1980’s. If the outcome of the
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2012 election is compared to that of 2016, Clinton received almost 300,000 less votes than
Obama in Michigan, and 240,000 less votes than Obama in Wisconsin (Leip). Furthermore, for
the first time since 1980 the Republican ticket snatched an electoral vote in Maine, a state that
also supported Sanders in the primary (Shaw 2016, 19). Minnesota, another state Sanders won
in the Democratic primary, saw a decrease of roughly 180,000 Democratic votes from 2012 to
2016. The migration of these missing Democratic voters had a significant impact on the election.
The most likely destination for these voters was the Green Party, the party whose ideology aligned
the most with Sanders supporters. The 2016 election saw Green candidate Jill Stein win almost
1.5 million votes, surpassing the party’s total vote count in 2012 by more than one million votes
(Leip). The Trump-Pence ticket also managed to take advantage of the disgruntled Sanders
supporters, as 12% of those who voted for Sanders in the Democratic primary defected to Trump
in the general election (Kurtzleben 2017). Ultimately, Kaine’s limited contribution to the
Democratic ticket supports the belief that vice presidential nominees can only hurt the ticket, as
he was unable to deliver any constituency other than his home state. Pence on the other hand
refutes that belief, as the Republican ticket scored big among key demographic groups.
The “Pence Effect”: How a VP Nominee Won a Presidential Election
It is no question that Clinton and Trump were two of the most controversial presidential
candidates to represent their respective parties. In the case of Trump, Republican politicians and
voters alike were stunned by his sudden rise to the party’s nomination. The Trumpian takeover of
the party left many conservatives mortified and disillusioned by thoughts of Trump in the White
House (NR Staff 2016). Because doubt and uncertainty plagued the Republican ticket, Trump
needed to find a running mate that could assuage concerns among conservatives. As such, it is
imperative to examine the formation of the 2016 Republican ticket and assess the value that
Pence brought to it; in other words, the explanation of why Pence was tapped as Trump’s running
mate will clarify the role Pence plays in the 2016 general election.
As previously highlighted, political parties must take into account the potential home state
and regional advantages of the vice president nominees when constructing a presidential ticket
(Garand 1998, 85). Because the U.S. elects the president through the Electoral College, vice
presidential nominees may represent regional advantages that can tip the electoral scales in a
particular party’s favor. Moreover, VP nominees are subject to extensive media coverage due to
their strategic implications for presidential elections. As such, media analysts and political junkies
alike often refer to this selection process as the “veepstakes” (Devine and Kopko 2011, 1).
Because of these reasons, Trump and his campaign saw a momentous opportunity to catch the
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public’s eye. The Republican “veepstakes” was filled with high-profile names that included current
and former governors, members of Congress, and presidential candidates. Despite the large
number of perceived running mates and subsequent news coverage, the Washington Post
eventually reported three individuals that made “Trump’s short list”: former speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, and Pence, who was currently the governor
of Indiana (Uhrmacher et. al 2016). In retrospect, it is easy to understand Trump’s logic in
selecting Pence over Gingrich and Christie. The following reasons will underline how politically
valuable Pence was to the Republican ticket and neatly explain what Pence delivered to Trump
on Election Day.
Gingrich—the most well-known of the three individuals—served in the House for two
decades from 1979-1999, holding the titles of Minority Whip and Speaker of the House in the
latter decade (Zengerle 2007, 201). Credited with engineering the Republican revolution that
overtook Congress in 1994, Gingrich won much acclaim among conservatives for his bombastic
personality and combative approach towards President Bill Clinton. This combative nature,
however, took a turn for the worst as Gingrich was later blamed for a twenty-seven day
government shutdown, as well as a controversial impeachment process (Highton 2002, 4). These
theatrics prompted a staunch rebuke of the Republicans in the 1998 midterms as the Democrats
picked up seats in the House, marking the first time in fifty-eight years that a party in control of
the White House accomplished such a feat in a midterm election (Ornstein et. al 2000, 54).
Gingrich’s reputation suffered a major blow as his leadership was lambasted for the catastrophic
election results it produced and the subsequent setback for the Republican Party. As a
consequence, Gingrich did not seek reelection as Speaker and immediately resigned from the
House (Zengerle 2007, 203). A staunch conservative with strong relationships in the South,
Gingrich provided a route to securing the southern vote for Trump. This strategy could have
garnered key electoral votes in the swing states of North Carolina and Florida. His state of Georgia
was not considered a swing state for the 2016 election, as it had reliably voted Republican in
every presidential election since 1992 (Leip).
The second potential nominee, Christie, was a governor from New Jersey who was in the
middle of his second term when his name was floated as a possible running mate. Just earlier
that year, he had ended his presidential campaign against Trump in the Republican primary.
Although Christie had no prior experience in Washington, Christie became a national figure for
his efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. However, the infamous Fort Lee lane
closure scandal—also known as Bridgegate—exacerbated his declining approval ratings among
New Jerseyans (Symons 2016). Although Christie was well-known when he ran for president, his
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popularity was quite low (Hutchins 2017). It appeared very unlikely that Trump paired with Christie
could carry New Jersey in the general election, as the traditionally blue state had not voted
Republican in a presidential election since 1988 (Leip). Christie’s status as a moderate, however,
could be seen as appealing to independents, and thus help Trump in swing states such as
Pennsylvania, Florida, or Ohio.
Pence, unlike the other two potential nominees, had experience as both a Congressman
and a Governor. As previously mentioned, Pence had served in the House for twelve years before
being elected as Indiana’s governor in 2012. Towards the latter part of his tenure in Congress,
Pence served as the House Republican Conference Chair in 2009 (“Donald Trump Chooses His”).
When Pence was reported to be a potential running mate for Trump, he was in the middle of his
first term as governor. Pence was not perceived to be a national figure by any means, and his
tenure as governor was nothing outstanding. Pence’s approval ratings had dwindled due to a
number of issues, including criticism for his lackluster response to an HIV epidemic that hit Indiana
(Gonsalves and Crawford 2020). Although Indiana was a “safe” state for the Republicans in 2016,
Pence was perceived as the candidate who could foster a Republican victory in the Midwest, an
electorally-valuable region with the key swing states of Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
After assessing these candidates, the selection of Pence was a suitable one. As a political
figure with plenty of experience in Congress, unlike Christie, Pence was well-known on Capitol
Hill. Although Gingrich used to be a prominent member of Congress, it had nearly been two
decades since he last served. Moreover, his popularity among conservatives significantly declined
during his time as Speaker. Simply put, Gingrich was not popular enough and too alienating of a
figure to be vice president. Unless Trump felt the South was in serious jeopardy, it would have
made little sense to select the former congressman from Georgia. Christie was also not
necessarily a popular candidate, as demonstrated by his low approval ratings in his own state.
He could not carry any electoral region in the country and the only electoral implications of his
selection was making Trump more viable in swing states. However, such a “balance” of a ticket
did not guarantee electoral fortune, and the selection of Christie could potentially alienate the
more conservative wing of Trump’s base. The most reliable person to deliver votes was Pence.
The Midwest was a region that the Trump campaign was actively targeting, and selecting a strong
conservative from that region made the most sense. Although Pence did not have the national
profile that the other two possessed, a low-key pick was safer than selecting someone with an
unpopular, polarizing background (D. Graham 2016). However, Pence not only brought the
Midwest to the table, but also a much more valuable constituency in the form of the Evangelical
community.
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Perhaps the most important aspect that factored into Trump’s decision-making was not
the candidate’s electoral strength in their respective regions, but their religion. Throughout the
campaign, Trump vehemently promoted social conservative values, vowing to “break the
influence of the immoral liberal elite” and “restore the true character of the nation” (Groitl 2017,
3). This appeal to social conservative values resonated with Evangelical voters, a central part of
Trump’s base. Gingrich and Christie were both Catholics, whereas Pence was a staunch
Evangelical. Pence’s track record as governor speaks for itself: his Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) was criticized by many as a means to deny services to same-sex couples,
although Pence opposed that interpretation and clarified that the bill’s intent was not to allow
discrimination (Ortiz 2015). Pence was also responsible for state funding cuts to Planned
Parenthood clinics and instituting some of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country (Foran
2018). As previously mentioned, a FiveThirtyEight projection model found that Pence was the
most conservative vice presidential nominee in the model’s database (Enten 2016). Moreover,
the Midwest is a region home to a prominent white, Evangelical community. For example,
Evangelicals account for the largest religious group in Ohio (29%), Indiana (31%), and Michigan
(25%). Iowa (28%) and Wisconsin (22%) are also home to a considerable Evangelical community
(“Religion in America: U.S.”). Pence not only represented the Midwest on behalf of Indiana, but
on behalf of the white, Evangelical community as well. No other candidate was better suited to
complement Trump’s courting of the Evangelical vote than Pence.
The results of the 2016 election highlight the impact that Pence had on the electoral
outcome. Other than Illinois and Minnesota, the rest of the Midwest voted for Trump. This
underscored a massive flip in the electoral map in a span of four years. In the 2012 general
election between Romney and the Democratic incumbent Obama, Obama carried six states from
the region. Among those states that Trump was able to capture in 2016 were swing states Iowa,
Ohio, and Wisconsin. Trump also flipped Michigan, a state that had not voted Republican in a
presidential election since 1988. Moreover, Trump came up short in Minnesota by only 45,000
votes, a state that Romney lost by 226,000 votes in 2012 and that no Republican has won since
President Nixon in 1972 (Leip). Trump also won a greater share of white Evangelical voters (81%)
than any Republican nominee in the previous four election cycles. In 2012, Romney had only
secured 78% of this voting bloc (Martínez and Smith 2016). If white Evangelicals are removed
from the “White Vote,” exit polls showed that a majority of non-evangelical whites actually voted
for Clinton (Wong 2018, 2). Therefore, the Evangelical vote was a major contribution to Trump’s
victory. Outside of New England, Trump carried twenty-one of the twenty-two states whose voting
populaces are majority white Christians, the one outlier being Minnesota (Cox 2016).
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Feasible or Farfetched: The overestimation of a VP nominee?
The argument that vice presidential nominees have a profound impact on the electoral
outcomes of general presidential elections is a difficult one to make. As seen in previously
highlighted literature, many studies found that vice presidential nominees have little, if any,
influence on the general election outcome (Grofman and Kline 2010, 308; Uscinski 2012, 61).
Moreover, the 2008 election may be an exception to the rule, as one can underscore the high
levels of media exposure that Palin received on the campaign as the reason for her influence
(“The Palin Phenomenon Drives”). However, no evidence suggests that in 2016 Kaine or Pence
did receive such media exposure on the campaign trail: an NBC poll revealed that both were
largely unknown to registered voters (Hartig et. al 2016). Despite all of this, one cannot ignore the
constituencies that both vice presidential nominees highlighted. The flipping of the Midwest from
Obama to Trump cannot excuse Pence from the equation, as the Indianan was a staunch social
conservative and Evangelical. Democrats failed to pick up any major geographic constituency, as
Kaine could only deliver Virginia. The balance, or lack thereof, of both party’s tickets also made
an impact on voter turnout. The Republican ticket featured an insider-outsider balance and
ideological balance in which Pence’s experience on Capitol Hill mitigated the concerns of
establishment Republicans about casting a vote for Trump. Moreover, if it were not for the “most
conservative” vice presidential nominee, the right-wing of the Republican Party could have passed
on Trump (Enten 2016). On the other hand, the Democratic ticket did not illustrate an insideroutsider balance nor an ideological balance. An “establishment Wall Street Democrat” like Kaine
did little to convince the left wing of the Democratic Party, particularly Sanders supporters, to cast
a ballot for the Democratic ticket (Scher 2016). As a result, the country witnessed traditionally
blue states such as Michigan and Wisconsin vote Republican for the first time in three decades
(Leip).
Although the above results prove that the Midwest and the Evangelical vote were
conducive to Trump’s victory, it is difficult to measure the magnitude of Pence’s role on the
outcome. Selecting a running mate from the Midwest was a failed strategy for Republicans in the
past. Romney had selected Wisconsin Congressman Paul Ryan, a white Christian, to be his
running mate in 2012 (Zeleny and Rutenberg 2012). As previously mentioned, Romney would
lose Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Therefore, a running mate from the Midwest could not have been
the sole reason for the sudden flip of the Midwest, nor can it explain the unexpected outcomes in
Michigan and Minnesota, two states that have reliably voted Democratic for decades.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that throughout the campaign Trump sought the Evangelical vote.
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By selecting Pence as his vice presidential nominee, Trump was able to solidify his support among
Evangelicals, as demonstrated by the highest Evangelical turnout for the Republican ticket in the
last four election cycles (“How the Faithful Voted”). Although it may be difficult to measure, the
constituencies that Pence represented without a doubt carried the Republican ticket across the
finish line.
Conclusion
The 2016 election continues to be examined through a number of angles to explain its
outcome. However, in order to analyze this unexpected outcome, it is important to look at the
parts of the country that exhibited surprising results. The outcomes in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin created electoral shockwaves, as all of these states had voted
Democratic just four years prior. Moreover, one must revert back to the 1980s to see the last time
that some of these states voted for a Republican candidate in a presidential election. Therefore,
this paper has proposed two theories that attempt to explain why these states suddenly shifted
Republican, ultimately culminating in Trump’s victory.
The first theory explored the impact of vice presidential choice on the election outcome.
Because of the immense unfavorability that voters expressed towards Clinton and Trump, vice
presidential selection greatly influenced voter choice. Pence provided regional, ideological, and
insider-outsider balance to the Republican ticket, while Kaine only provided limited regional
balance. The balanced ticket of Trump and Pence prevailed in the parts of the country that proved
essential to electoral victory. The outcomes in the Midwest and Rust Belt spoke to the strength of
the Republican ticket and reflected the Democratic ticket’s weaknesses. Moreover, the lack of
ideological balance on the Democratic side reflected Clinton’s failure to recognize the fracture
within her own party, as traditionally blue states that Sanders won in the Democratic primary
became key losses for Clinton in the general election. By not selecting a running mate that was
attentive to the Midwest or Rust Belt, she handed the election to Trump.
The second theory emphasized the role of Trump’s running mate in terms of the
constituencies that he represents. The Midwest was a region of the country with major electoral
ramifications. Pence’s tenure as congressman and later as governor of Indiana influenced how
citizens perceived Pence, especially among those who resided in the Midwest. More importantly,
the Midwest is home to a large Evangelical population, the core of Trump’s base. Because Pence
himself was a strong, socially conservative Evangelical, his nomination for vice president played
into the Evangelical support that Trump was actively seeking. What Pence ultimately brought to
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the table delivered one of the most historic upsets in U.S. presidential election history, as the
Midwest and mass mobilization of Evangelical voters produced electoral victory for Trump.
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Abstract
Civil conflicts sometimes end with militant groups transitioning into political parties and
taking part in a state’s legitimate electoral process. This paper aims to determine factors that
make some former militant groups more electorally viable than others. A comparative analysis is
done studying the ideology, organizational structure and tactics of two cases from 20th century
civil conflicts in Latin America: the FMLN in El Salvador and the FARC in Colombia. It is
determined that the big-tent ideology, traditional structure and more selective use of tactical
violence contributed to the FMLN’s electoral successes.
The FMLN and FARC as Diverging Models of Post-Conflict Integration
Bloody civil conflicts have shaped the modern world. Entire states, like Bosnia and Serbia,
have been created as the result of civil war. Protracted civil conflicts, like the ongoing Syrian Civil
War, continue to affect global politics. Few regions have seen as much civil strife as Latin America.
Images of civil war in Latin America have permeated the global consciousness with figures like
Che Guevara becoming symbols of popular revolution. Throughout the 20th and into the 21st
century, civil war and revolution have repeatedly upended the politics of Latin America and
rewritten the trajectory of nations. Many civil wars end in either government or rebel victory, while
roughly a quarter end with a negotiated settlement that combine “disarmament and
demobilization” with wider “social, economic, political and military reforms” with the goal of
establishing the parties involved in violent conflict as contending non-violent political parties
(Allison 2010, p. 104). Civil conflicts ending in settlement can give birth to democracies or widen
the scope of an existing democratic regime by including opposition factions in the governing
process.
This paper aims to analyze two civil conflicts that led to the integration of militant rebel
groups as part of the democratic processes of their respective states: El Salvador’s Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The challenges of post-conflict governance continue to haunt the international community, with
many countries that have recently experienced civil wars facing instability (Hartzell, Hoddie and
Rothchild 2001, p. 183). Identifying factors that may lead to the successful, peaceful political
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integration of militant insurgent groups can help states, policymakers, and scholars better
understand the process of post-conflict governance and how democratic stability can be
maintained even when threatened by political violence. Several important factors will be
considered, including the groups’ organizational structures, their tactics, and the responses of
their states’ governments in order to determine what circumstances might lead to the most
favorable electoral outcome for a newly integrated militant group.
The FMLN waged a civil war in El Salvador from its establishment as a left-wing multigroup coalition in 1980 until the end of hostilities in 1992 (Álvarez 2010, p.p. 17, 23). Five militant
groups formed the FMLN at the outset of El Salvador’s civil war in May of 1980: the Popular
Forces of Liberation-Farabundo Martí, the People’s Revolutionary Army, the National Resistance,
the Revolutionary Party of the Workers of Central America, and the Communist Party of El
Salvador (Chávez 2015, p. 1786). As the war escalated, it was estimated that the FMLN had more
than 10,000 combatants and had “maintained the support of roughly 50,000 Salvadorans during
the course of the conflict,” making it one of the largest guerilla groups in the western hemisphere
(Allison 2010, p. 157). The FMLN, as both a militant resistance group and a future political party,
embraced a coalition identity. The five constituent groups that initially formed the FMLN had
agreed on left-wing political sympathies but varied greatly in organizational processes and
ideological specifics (Chávez 2015, p. 1787). Joaquín Chávez (2015) noted that the FMLN’s
leadership included not only Marxist-Leninists, but “social democrats, radicalized Catholics and
eclectic intellectuals and activists” (p. 1786). This effectively made the FMLN a joint effort between
El Salvador’s “New Left” and the country’s Communist Party (Chávez 2015, p. 1787). Chávez
credits much of the FMLN’s post-war political success to the malleability of this coalition, writing
that “the pragmatism the FMLN showed during the peace talks opened a path for unprecedented
political reforms” (2015, p. 1785). Much of this flexible pragmatism came from the top. Before
engaging in peace talks, the FMLN’s leaders had engaged in a civil war with perpetually shifting
circumstances and objectives (Chávez 2015, p.p. 1787-1788). The same adaptability that allowed
the FMLN to meet the changing conditions of war proved advantageous for its foray into electoral
politics. By the late 1980s, the group had largely abandoned its roots in militant Marxist-Leninism
and adopted a more moderate, democratic-socialist approach (Chávez 2015, p.p. 1787-1788).
An end to the war was negotiated in 1992, and by the time elections were held two years later,
the FMLN had established itself as a formidable opposition party, well integrated into the postwar political institutions of El Salvador (Sprenkels 2019, p. 7).
The FMLN borrowed tactical cues from leftist revolutionaries throughout the 20 th century,
adopting what José Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer (1995) observed as Ho Chi
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Minh’s “Prolonged Popular War” (p. 14). This tactical methodology synthesized “guerilla warfare,
maneuver warfare, and attrition warfare,” utilizing the different strategies across the conflict as
necessary (Bracamonte & Spencer 1995 p. 14). The FMLN combined asymmetric guerilla tactics
such as mines and ambushes with attacks on infrastructure and the fomenting of popular civil
unrest, including protests (Bracamonte & Spencer 1995, p.p. 27-28). According to Bracamonte
and Spencer, the civil protests served to legitimize resistance against the government while
highlighting repressive state responses, which bolstered FMLN recruitment (p. 27). The tactics
embraced by the FMLN highlight the group’s multifaceted and adaptable structure. By focusing
on tactics that led to recruitment, the FMLN established a potent model for developing political
capital and retained a meaningful level of popular support during the peace negotiations in the
1990s.
The government in El Salvador responded to the FMLN’s uprising by attempting to employ
overwhelming violence that some scholars have designated as “state terror” (Petras 1987 p. 324).
James Petras (1987) notes that state terror usually serves to strike down organized resistance
movements and to “dismantle… political institutions” (p. 314). The Salvadoran government,
backed by the United States, indirectly employed “civilian fringe” death squads who not only
engaged the FMLN but committed massive acts of violence against the Salvadoran people
(Petras 1987 p. 329). The conflict reached a virtual stalemate by the late 1980s, leaving the FMLN
and the Salvadoran government open to peace talks (Chávez 2015, p. 1785). The government,
seeing that the conflict was virtually unwinnable and that the FMLN were willing to negotiate,
began seeking a meaningful compromise. Ultimately, an agreement was reached between the
parties that shrank the Salvadoran military and created the National Civilian Police to replace
existing militarized police forces in exchange for the demobilization of the FMLN and its integration
into the democratic process as a party (Chávez 2015, p. 1792). The Salvadoran government
responded to the FMLN with unbridled force first, and pragmatic negotiations later. While the
government-sponsored brutality that marked the heights of the war helped foment popular support
for the FMLN, the government’s willingness to negotiate towards the end of the war gave the
FMLN a sizable opening to involve themselves in democratic governance.
The FARC followed a different organizational trajectory. The group was founded in 1964
by a handful of guerillas in the Colombian mountains and grew slowly: in 1982 the FARC boasted
about 3,000 members (Molano 2000, p.p. 26-27). By the late 1990s, the FARC had grown to
include about 18,000 active members (Petras and Brescia 2000, p. 134). The FARC was largely
made up of peasants, although they initially attracted students and intellectuals to a lesser extent
(Molano 2000, p. 26). Vera Eccarius-Kelly (2012) wrote at length about the organizational
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structure of the FARC in an article entitled “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the
FARC and the PKK.” Eccarius-Kelly claimed that the FARC’s commitment to Leninism
predisposed the group to rigid ideological hierarchy, describing the leadership of the FARC in the
late 2000s as “dogmatic and unbending… even though the organization experienced a
tremendous loss of credibility” (2012, p. 237). The narcotics trade is deeply intertwined with the
FARC’s structure, lending some members to relative self-direction (Eccarius-Kelly 2012 p. 237).
At the outset of the Colombian civil war, the FARC found most of its funding from “revolutionary
taxes” extracted from “landowners and peasants,” a system that some have compared to extortion
(Eccarius-Kelly 2012, p. 240). The FARC later reoriented its organizational structure to focus on
a more lucrative source of funding: narcotics. By the 1990s, the FARC had established a regime
controlling drug cultivators and traffickers that Eccarius-Kelly described as a “shadow regime,”
noting that the United States’s Government Accountability Office estimated that the FARC profited
off of roughly 60% of cocaine on the U.S. market (p. 240). The FARC’s unwavering ideological
commitments, combined with its structural reliance on the drug trade, presented serious problems
to the group’s legitimization. The FARC failed to garner popular support despite challenging the
Colombian state for decades: Eccarius-Kelly wrote that in 2008, only one percent of urban
Colombians viewed the FARC positively (2012, p. 237).
The nature of Colombia’s civil war was in some ways more complex than that of El
Salvador’s: the FARC was not only engaged in hostilities with the Colombian government, but
also with paramilitary autodefensas of varying political affiliation, all while maintaining its share of
the international drug market (McDougall 2009, p. 335). The FARC adopted a slew of often severe
tactics to meet these needs. According to Chris Lee (2012), the FARC has been deeply involved
in kidnapping and extortion (2012, p. 29). The group also routinely employed child soldiers,
inviting harsh condemnation from the international community (Lee 2012, p. 35). FARC tactics
frequently led to the deaths of civilians. Among these tactics were bombings of public spaces, the
use of land mines, and violence targeting “entire villages” (Lee 2012, p. 36). As the FARC is a
primarily rural group, these attacks often targeted urban areas, killing civilians and damaging
urban infrastructure (Lee 2012, p. 37). Most Colombians live in the cities, and the FARC’s wanton
approach to violence towards urban centers of power both hindered the group’s attempts at
recruitment and bolstered the government’s image as peacekeepers (Lee 2012, p.p. 29, 36-37).
The Colombian conflict lasted for decades, a quagmire of government military forces,
revolutionary guerilla armies, and local paramilitaries all vying for their preferred outcomes. Alex
McDougall (2009) posited that this multiparty complexity made the conflict “intractable” (p. 322).
McDougall ultimately pointed out that Colombia’s military attempts to stymie the conflicts within
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its own borders were untenable because of the Colombian state’s “infrastructural weakness”
(2009, p. 328). Because of this institutional weakness, the Colombian military adopted a
counterinsurgency strategy that focused on the “containment, not eradication of guerilla forces”
(McDougall 2009, p. 333). The weakness of the Colombian state led directly to the development
of civilian militias, which eventually became controlled by paramilitary groups (McDougall 2009,
p. 334). Colombia’s structural weakness affected its response to the conflict by encouraging
repeated but tenuous attempts at peace accords. Molano noted that the FARC and the Colombian
government have engaged in regular peace talks since the early 1980s, with little success (2000,
p. 27). Since the Colombian government’s military response to the FARC was primarily defensive,
acts of violence by the FARC were highly visible and could easily be interpreted as wanton
aggression. The FARC’s ideological rigidity, excessive tactics, and unwillingness to work with the
Colombian government failed to engender its appeal as a post-war electoral option.
El Salvador held elections in 1994, at which time the FMLN ran candidates and found
almost immediate political success, capturing roughly 25% of the vote and establishing itself as
the second largest political party in El Salvador (Allison 2010, p. 114). Since the 1990s, the FMLN
has continued its record of electoral victories, with FMLN candidates winning presidential
elections in 2009 and 2014 (Sprenkels 2019, p. 11). A 2016 peace accord, formally titled “Final
Agreement for Ending the Armed Conflict and Building Stable and Lasting Peace,” was initially
rejected by referendum but passed by the government of Colombia (Gomez-Suarez 2017, p. 466).
This agreement led to the establishment of a political successor to the FARC, sharing the
organization’s acronym, known as the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (Watson 2018).
Colombia’s 2018 elections saw the FARC win a mere half of a percent of the vote, yielding them
only the ten congressional seats guaranteed by the 2016 deal (Watson 2018). The FMLN has
seen sustained and increasing political success after the conclusion of the Salvadoran civil war,
while the FARC has struggled to integrate itself into the governing processes of Colombia. This
paper argues that the FMLN owes its political successes to its inception as a broad coalition, its
more popular tactical decisions, and the role and response of El Salvador’s government to the
conflict.
The FMLN fostered a social and political image of collective struggle while engendering
itself with El Salvador’s voters by moderating its ideology and seeking a tenable end to its conflict
with the Salvadoran government. The unbending FARC, with its involvement in the international
drug trade and proclivity for terroristic violence, failed to build a base of electoral support in
Colombia. Salvadorans had another reason to throw their electoral support behind the FMLN: the
relative institutional strength of El Salvador. The Salvadoran government, while unpopular enough
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to experience a civil war, had a strong presence in negotiations and settled the conflict quickly
and effectively. This was not true in Colombia, where peace talks collapsed time and time again.
This relative institutional strength allowed the demobilized FMLN a smoother integration into postwar El Salvador.
It is worth noting that the FMLN’s comparative electoral success has not precluded the
group from integration challenges. The 2019 presidential election in El Salvador ended with a
decisive rout of the FMLN, who lost roughly seventy percent of their vote share when compared
with the previous election (Sprenkels 2019, p. 1). Critics and former party members have
attributed the party’s decline in support to practices including nepotism and corruption (Sprenkels
2019, p. 3). Activists, once the backbone of the FMLN’s rise to serious political contention, have
abandoned the party, in part due to its cessation of internal democratic processes for electing
officials .(Sprenkels 2019, p.p. 2-3). These intra-party elections were replaced with a central, elite
hierarchy that filled out the party’s leadership (Sprenkels 2019, p. 2). Former FMLN minister José
Luis Merino was, beginning in 2016, under investigation by the United States’ Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations for suspicion of drug trafficking, with some commentators noting his
connections to Colombia’s FARC (Ávalos 2018). In light of the party’s growing reputation for
corruption and connection to drug trafficking, it is not surprising that Nayib Bukele, the victor of
the 2019 election and El Salvador’s current president, was propelled to victory on a promise to
crack down on corruption (Palumbo and Malkin 2019). The FMLN’s integration success found
through compromise has been challenged by institutional rigidity and the tolerance of unpopular
political behaviors.
Peace negotiators involved in civil conflicts might look to the case of the FMLN as a
successful model of initial post-war democratic integration. The mutual willingness of the FMLN
and the Salvadoran government to meaningfully compromise is a vital reason for the lasting end
to El Salvador’s civil war. Researchers analyzing electoral results can apply lessons from the
FMLN’s relatively successful integration to other post-conflict democracies in order to foster a
greater understanding of how newly demobilized resistance groups can find long-term democratic
success. Groups embroiled in civil conflicts can likewise use examples like the FMLN to look
towards a peaceful end to hostilities. The international community should pay attention to cases
of lasting democratic integration and continuing post-conflict peace, as well as the situations in
which those goals are not achieved. Navigating the potentially explosive landscape of post-war
states requires all the tools available, and the comparison between the FARC and FMLN provides
useful insights into what happens in the post-war era.
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Abstract
This paper examines censorship and ideology in modern China, providing historical
context in regards to the motives and goals of the Chinese Communist Party. The paper discusses
how China's increasingly severe policies of Internet censorship are part of a prolonged effort to
ensure "social cohesion" as part of the "Chinese Dream" - a longstanding goal of the Communist
Party to bring about "National Rejuvenation" in China. Chronologically, the paper focuses on the
emergence of virtual censorship in the 1990s, leading to increasingly severe restrictions
throughout the 2000s emerging in tandem with new technologies such as facial recognition
software, and culminating with contemporary China under Xi Jinping - which has sought to export
its model of censorship to the wider world. The paper closes with details on Chinese influence in
Western industry, specifically in Hollywood/Entertainment, and a brief overview of the emergence
of COVID-19 and how China's censorship policies facilitated its global spread while allowing for
China's (at least purportedly) "brutal, but effective" quarantine lockdowns.

Censorship and Control in the PRC
The extent of surveillance, censorship, and societal control that the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) exerts upon China is a subject of international criticism and concern. For as long as
the Internet has been available in China, China’s political leadership has opted to systematically
conceal and obscure any information perceived as contrary to its own values and ideals. As the
Internet has become an increasingly ubiquitous aspect of modern life through the advent of mobile
phones, social media, and more sophisticated data transmission, the CCP has similarly opted to
increase the scale and sophistication of its censorship policies. Under the current administration
of Xi Jinping, the CCP’s active involvement in determining what Chinese citizens see and discuss,
as well as the scope of government intrusion in everyday life, has reached a new high. This paper
places the ideological bent of Chinese censorship within a larger historical context, analyzes the
underlying goals guiding the CCP’s policies, and examines the consequences of China’s blurred
distinction between the real and the virtual. It will also explore the extent to which the CCP’s model
may influence and spread beyond China’s borders as China seeks to reassert itself as a genuine
world power.
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China’s entry into modernity was tumultuous. The “century of humiliation” refers to a
period of Chinese history represented by civil collapse, economic exploitation by Western colonial
powers, and foreign invasion by Japan. These events brought about the end of Imperial China
and the eventual rise of the People’s Republic of China, headed by Mao Zedong. For decades,
Mao’s China remained insulated from international affairs as the revolutionary regime ushered in
transformative policies across Chinese society. With the intention of reinvigorating China’s
productivity, consolidating power and unity, and dissolving “antiquated” traditions supposedly
without place in the new China, such policies carried immense consequences–bookending
China’s century of humiliation with more destruction. The ethos of Communist China, instigated
by Mao, remains fundamentally shaped by reaction to the century of humiliation (Miller 2017, 37).
Despite the Cultural Revolution’s efforts to do away with antiquated traditions and ideals,
the notion that China’s “natural position” was firmly atop the sociopolitical hierarchy of Asia was
one that never went away. In this context, national revival entails a reclamation of what had been
lost. Chinese leadership from the time of Sun Yat-Sen to the modern reign of Xi Jinping has
asserted revanchist ideals, oriented towards reclaiming the status of a world-power. It entails not
only a consolidation and rejuvenation of stability and power within China, but a reasserted
presence and influence in the affairs of the wider world (Miller 2017, 8).
This notion of national revival has experienced a new birth under the current reign of Xi
Jinping, who has reasserted the sense that it is China’s destiny to reclaim its status as a worldpower and realize the Chinese Dream. With a target date of 2049, the centennial of the PRC’s
founding, Xi’s Chinese Dream represents the full realization of China’s restoration as a great
power worthy of its ancient pedigree. Despite its forward-thinking orientation, the ideals
underpinning the Chinese Dream are drawn from a self-perception of China being the center of
the world. At its core, China’s neo-imperialism seeks to prevent foreign influence and power from
metastasizing within China, while eventually exporting Chinese influence and power abroad
(Miller 2017, 17-18). While actively participating in the interconnected world and espousing a
sense of mutually beneficial globalism, the ideological base of modern China’s leadership remains
isolationist and nativist.
This principle policy of projecting outwards while insulating within is well-represented by
the reign of Xi Jinping. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has ushered in significant changes, shaped
by “revolutionary impulses”, which have effectively made him “the most powerful leader since Mao
Zedong” (Economy 2018, 11, 6-9). Xi’s reign has seen a reversal of decades of institutionalized
bureaucratic collective decision-making, and an intense consolidation of personal authority which
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has seated him at the hexin, or “core,” of political leadership. This inclination towards despotism
set the stage for the contemporary level of political repression, censorship, and “transformative”
state involvement in peoples’ lives seen in China today (Economy 2018, 24, 5). China now has
the power to exert more influence and play a larger role in international affairs as a state that has
backslid further towards totalitarian despotism.
In April, 2013, the central committee of the CCP circulated a document to all party
members entitled “A Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere.” This manifesto
reasserted an emphasis on ideological cohesion and unity within China, aggrandizing the “spirit”
of the Party’s Eighteenth National Congress and General Secretary Xi Jinping’s achievements in
“unifying the thought of the entire party, the entire country, and the entire people enormously.”
The manifesto also states “disseminating thought on the cultural front is the most important
political task” and resolves to “promote unification of thought.” The document portrays an
ideological struggle between the “false ideological trends” of the West and “socialism with Chinese
Characteristics and the Chinese Dream.” It goes on to list seven perceived existential threats to
the CCP (“Communiqué of the Ideological Sphere” 2013).
1. Promotion of Western constitutional democracy
2. Promotion of “universal values”
3. Promotion of civil society/individualism
4. Promotion of neoliberalism
5. Promotion of the West’s idea of journalism, which challenges the Party’s principle
that the media should be subject to Party discipline.
6. Promotion of “historical nihilism” – Advocacy for historical revisionism and criticism of
the CCP’s historical pedigree. Criticizing historical “revolutionary precursors”, “denying the
historical inevitability in China’s choice of socialism” and seeking to undermine the CCP’s
“historical purpose” as China’s true leadership.
7. Questioning the nature of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in regards to
China’s reform and opening – Claiming that China has thoroughly abandoned its
Marxist/Maoist ideology in favor of “state capitalism” or “new bureaucratic capitalism”. The
CCP claims that these “reactionary” views hinge upon Western standards of reform that
do not apply to China, and mentions the distinct role the Internet plays in disseminating
these ideas and facilitating criticism of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
A call to fortify socialism with Chinese characteristics permeates the text, with an
emphasis on recommitting to China’s extant socialist legacy while also introducing new concepts
to the CCP’s ideological canon, such as Xi’s Chinese Dream. The document represents an effort
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to bolster the cohesion of values within the CCP while rejecting influences from abroad, doubling
down on pre-existing trends of authoritarianism and government censorship. It also represents a
commitment to a Sinocentric view of the world, in which China’s political leadership dictates what
is ideologically acceptable and what is not, and that foreign criticisms are unimportant as their
perspectives and metrics are invalid. Crucially, the document makes note of the Internet’s
capacity to serve as a virtual battleground of ideas inseparable from the physical world, and as a
potential catalyst for the rapid dissemination of politically-sensitive information and foreign values.
This perspective of the Internet serves as the justification for the CCP’s active involvement in and
moderation of what Chinese citizens do online, as the Internet is not exempt from state power
and law.
The theme of Internet censorship in the Communiqué is but a recent and emboldened
manifestation of trends that have existed in China for some time. The CCP opened the Internet
to the general public in 1995, and by 1997 had enacted its first set of punitive restrictions on
content perceived as harmful to national security or state interests. This prefaced the
technological efforts of software engineer Fang Binxing, who is largely responsible for developing
the “Golden Shield,” a transformative software that allowed Party access to data channels and
the ability to block destination IP addresses and domain names. This software was the progenitor
to the set of restrictions and information regulations constituting China’s “Great Firewall,” and
precluded further expansion of the limits placed on what Chinese citizens could legally view and
discuss online. The majority of popular Western websites, frequently browsed everyday by people
outside of China, remain categorically banned (“The Great Firewall” 2018).
Increasingly strict regulations were established throughout the 2000s, mandating that all
internet use in China abided by the CCP’s rigid standards of conduct. Notably, China began to
elicit participation and complicity from the private sector. In 2000, the issuance of state council
order 292 mandated that Chinese Internet service providers enforce CCP regulations by assisting
in the moderation of data sent out on their services. Google, which was banned in China around
this time, would go on to introduce Google.cn, a censored version of the site which was tailored
to suit the demands of the CCP. In 2002, more than a hundred companies, including Yahoo,
signed the CCP’s Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China’s Internet Industry, based upon
“patriotic observances of the law, equitableness, trustworthiness, and honesty” (“The Great
Firewall” 2018). Western based websites were compelled to acquiesce to the censorship
demands of the CCP or have their content blocked entirely within China. For the sake of profit
and expansion, many Western companies were willing to oblige the CCP.
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Two years after the pledge was introduced, Yahoo cooperated with Chinese officials in
detaining and prosecuting Shi Tao, a journalist who used a Yahoo email account to leak
information regarding CCP restrictions on reporting. Yahoo handed over access to Shi’s email
account, which contained evidence used to prosecute and imprison Shi for 8 years. The
information Shi had leaked was a CCP document regarding the suppression of press coverage
of the 15th anniversary of the 1989 massacre of civilians at Tiananmen Square (King 2013). This
incident, in which Chinese troops opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy protests, was a brutal
demonstration of how far the CCP is willing to go in protecting itself and ensuring civilian
compliance.
China’s concerns over the Internet’s ability to foster political dissent were not entirely
unjustified. In 1998, China’s first “cyber-dissident” Lin Hai was arrested and imprisoned for
forwarding 30,000 Chinese email addresses to an American pro-democracy magazine (“The
Great Firewall” 2018). The following year, the spiritual organization Falun Gong used email and
mobile phones to organize a silent demonstration of 10,000 adherents at the CCP’s central
compound in Beijing. By then, the CCP had become seriously concerned with the emerging
religious practice, estimating that Falun Gong (“Buddhist Law” or “Dharma Wheel Practice”) had
at least 70 million adherents. Their reasons for the demonstration hinged upon demands for
government clarification on the legality of their practice and the easing of publishing restrictions
on Falun Gong texts (Faison 1999). Despite these seemingly innocuous demands, the fact that
virtual connectivity had allowed them to organize quickly and in large numbers, without detection,
prompted immense government alarm. That same year, a 1999 decision by the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee established a ban on “cult organizations,” giving the state the
authority to imprison and punish Falun Gong adherents as well as any other spiritual or religious
“dissidents” (“Resolution on Cults” 1999).
Although much of China’s censorship efforts have been oriented towards Western
influences, the systematic persecution and repression of Falun Gong adherents demonstrates
how even endemic Chinese movements and organizations are susceptible to government
prohibition if their beliefs are perceived as a threat to the values and ideological unity of the CCP.
The resolution on the banning of cult activity claimed “preventing and punishing cult activity” is
necessary in order to “maintain social stability, protect the interests of the people, and safeguard
reform.” The resolution goes on to purport a disparaging view of “cults” like Falun Gong, claiming
that they are criminal organizations which seek to “deify their leading members” and “deceive
people with superstitious ideals.” Special notice is given to Falun Gong’s leader, Li Hongzhi, who
is portrayed as a self-serving zealot made rich by “brainwashing his followers with heretical ideas”
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(“Resolution on Cults” 1999). This text demonstrates a shift in the CCP’s efforts to ensure “social
stability,” now actively crafting narratives of threats to the CCP as being more than just sources
of political opposition to the government policies, but existential threats to the social fabric of
China itself.
While perceived threats and transgressions from groups external to the CCP warrant
government crackdown and suppression, any mistakes or abuses of power made by the CCP are
usually kept hidden and whitewashed. The case of Shi Tao and the revelation China intended to
directly suppress coverage of the 15th anniversary of Tiananmen Square is one such example.
Suppression regarding annual commemorations of the massacre have since been established as
the norm, with an increased effort to censor Tiananmen related material on the Internet as well
as “dozens of activists and other critics” placed under house arrest or detained in runups to
subsequent anniversaries (Branigan 2014).
Other notable instances include the 2009 case of Deng Yujiao, a Hubei woman who
stabbed a Party official to death after he attempted to rape her. Deng was detained and committed
to a mental hospital, where she likely would have stayed were it not for the actions of blogger Wu
Gan. Wu collaborated with other web users to expose the incident in what is colloquially known
as a “human flesh search engine,” a term describing cooperative efforts between Chinese web
users to circumvent web filters and uncover censored information (“The Great Firewall” 2018).
The revelation prompted public outcry, and local authorities were compelled to release Deng.
Similarly, the CCP’s efforts to suppress coverage of the 2011 derailment of a high-speed train in
Wenzhou, which killed at least 40 people, were thwarted when local residents shared cell phone
photos and videos of the accident. The CCP relented to popular pressure and conducted an
investigation, issuing a report that blamed inadequate signal equipment and poor safety
procedures, and subsequently disciplining “as many as 54 officials” for their complicity in the
disaster (“The Great Firewall” 2018).
While these anecdotes reveal the persistent capability of Chinese citizens to use the
Internet as a means to hold government officials accountable, the more sinister takeaway from
these cases is that the CCP uses its own censorship policies as a way of covering up its instances
of criminal misrule. Furthermore, these cases only reveal the instances in which the CCP has
been plainly caught in the act. While the true extent of the CCP’s successful whitewashing is
unknown, the cases that have been exposed created considerable damage to public opinion and
revealed the enduring capability of China’s populace to circumvent government-imposed barriers
to virtual information sharing. In the runup to Xi Jinping’s 2012 ascension as General Secretary,
China’s leadership was faced with the issues of reconsolidating public support and adjusting to
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technological developments hampering its ability to control the flow of virtual information. What
has since followed is a two-pronged approach: publicly committing to increased government
accountability while dramatically expanding the scope of government censorship.
Not long after assuming power, Xi ushered in a series of campaigns directed at curbing
the excess and mismanagement of Party officials. As these cases revealed, China’s rapid growth
in wealth and power had carried with it the consequences of the CCP’s ideological decay and
rampant political corruption, which was publicly illuminated despite the already extensive level of
government censorship. According to Elizabeth Economy, with the ostensible goal of culling
government abuses of power in regards to bureaucratic mismanagement and the misuse of public
expenditures for “vanity projects,” Xi’s reformation campaign has led to the “disciplining” of
hundreds of thousands of Party officials since 2013. This has facilitated Xi’s consolidation of a
“cult of personality,” with his anti-corruption efforts drawing a large measure of public support and
approval for his personal consolidation of power. Despite this, doubts remain. Xi’s anti corruption
campaign has rendered a “paradoxical dilemma,” in which Xi’s efforts to address extant criticisms
of corruption and discipline crooked officials make him popular while further damaging the lasting
legitimacy of the CCP as a whole (Economy 2018, 31-39). While this is likely the case, Xi’s
contemporaneous efforts to solidify government control and statewide censorship have further
hampered the ability of Chinese citizens to voice criticisms of government or organize resistance.
While Chinese citizens may see corruption as an inherent issue within the CCP, their ability to do
anything about it is now more unlikely.
Xi’s China has redoubled its commitment to ideological cohesion with documents like the
Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere. While Xi’s efforts to rectify the
government’s public image can be seen as a legitimate addressment to years of growing
dissatisfaction with incidents of misrule and corruption, the larger motivation is actively
consolidating stability at home in order to realize the outward ambitions of the Chinese Dream.
This is demonstrated by the sweeping and aggressive additions to Internet censorship and
government presence in the lives of Chinese citizens. Xi’s commitment to repressing information
and keeping the populace passive, stable, and ideologically unified has fostered a swath of
expanded regulations, new technological systems of surveillance and control, and the reasserted
view of foreign influences and ideas as existential threats to China itself.
The social credit system is a virtual construct, still undergoing development and expansion
that is used to measure the individual “reputations” of Chinese citizens. It relies upon the National
Credit Information Sharing Platform, established in 2015, which itself is the virtual culmination of
sectoral social-credit database “trials” that began in 2009 and the old dang’an (dossier) system,
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which records and archives information on individual citizens (Economy 2018, 78-80; Ding &
Zhou, n.d.). The CCP’s system, centralized under the national People’s Bank of China in 2018,
typifies China’s interplay of the private and public sectors engaging with retail and financial
multinationals like Alibaba, as well as social media companies like Baihe, an online dating service,
in order to collect information and promote the importance of reputation in the private sphere.
Good behavior begets personal incentives, such as a premium spot on Baihe’s matchmaking list,
access to better loans and general financial opportunities, or a favorable impression in the eyes
of potential employers and academia (Hatton 2015). Bad behavior (criminality, a lack of financial
or civic prudence, or a lack of work ethic and consistent employment, etc.) begets penalties in the
form of travel restrictions, public shaming in interconnected media services, and denied access
to the “rewards” for good behavior (Ding & Zhou). An official document circulated by the Chinese
government in 2014 outlines the goals and progression of the system through 2020, advocating
for expansion and eventual standardization. The outline is laden with language reminiscent of the
Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere, citing the importance of
strengthening societal integrity, credibility, and cohesion (“Social Credit System Plan” 2014).
In 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence described the social credit system as “an
Orwellian system premised on controlling virtually every facet of human life” (Hornsley 2018).
What he is discussing, as it is generally portrayed, does not exist – at least not yet. China’s current
system is immense and complex in regards to its scale and structure, which has fostered Western
invocations of Orwell’s 1984 and the notion that China possesses a centralized totalitarian
surveillance network. In reality, “there is no such thing as a national ‘social credit score’” (Hornsley
2018). The social credit system is not yet centralized under full CCP control, and remains
distributed among an array of local authorities, multinational firms, service providers, and central
government apparatuses (Hornsley 2018). Still, as a virtual framework that continues to evolve
and expand, it is not unreasonable to consider it possible for the social credit system to eventually
resemble Pence’s “Orwellian” nightmare. In examining the social credit system within a wider
historical context of systematic censorship and control in China, the system has effectively
transplanted a deeper burden of accountability onto Chinese citizens. It is difficult to imagine that
citizens will be as eager to voice concerns or criticisms of the government if they know their
reputation, mediated by a virtual system, is at stake
The CCP’s efforts to facilitate the unification of ideological thought among Chinese citizens
extends beyond ethnic Han-Chinese to include China’s regional minority populations. The CCP’s
repression of the Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang is a persisting source of warranted
international criticism, as the Chinese government has effectively rendered the region a police
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state where homes are raided, religious symbols are banned, and Uyghurs are regularly detained
under suspicion of “terrorism” (Miller 2017, 62). In what can be seen as part of a larger effort to
consolidate stability and eliminate the threat of endemic uprising, not unlike the treatment of Falun
Gong and other “cults,” the CCP has dedicated much of its technological advancements in
surveillance and censorship towards China’s ethnic minorities. Xinjiang became the focal point
for the eventual nationwide buildup of facial recognition technology, which became “part of the
fabric of life in China in 2019” (Feng 2019). Technological advancements have allowed for a
system of cross-comparison between different surveillance databases housing information from
the hundreds of millions of cameras across China’s cities, indexing people by facial recognition
data which can now identify people by ethnicity. While the technology is currently dependent on
favorable lighting and weather conditions to render precise facial readings, its accuracy is quickly
rising. The proliferation of facial recognition technology in China is used as a “blunt tool of
intimidation” (Feng 2019). The fact that many Chinese cities now resemble a virtual panopticon
is a powerful force in dissuading citizens from acting out of line, and ensuring the “strengthening
of social integrity and cohesion” (Feng 2019). This is perhaps the greatest manifestation of the
CCP’s view that there is no distinction between the virtual and the real.
Facial recognition technology, with its ability to discern ethnic identity, has played a
significant role in the detention and reeducation of China’s Uyghur population. With the ostensible
goal of deradicalizing potential terrorists following years of ethnic unrest and instances of violent
conflict, at least 1 million Uyghurs have been detained and sent to prison camps that are officially
referred to as vocational-training centers. Detainable offenses include “even the most innocuous”
forms of religious piety, such as sporting long beards detectable by surveillance cameras with
facial recognition technology (Simonds 2020). In these camps, detainees are subjected to
mandatory indoctrination, forcibly compelling them to renounce their culture and religion and
assimilate with the Han-Chinese under Chinese Communism. In the wake of international criticism
and support from the US House of Representatives for sanctions against Chinese officials, the
CCP launched a counteroffensive media campaign through social media, “blistering” editorials,
and attacks on the validity of Western journalism to justify Uyghur internment and depict critics as
“players in a Western conspiracy” (Buckley & Ramzy 2019). Chinese state-run media reframed
detention as “rehabilitation,” repropagated footage of Uyghur militant attacks, and emphasized
the return of stability to the region. Meanwhile, expatriate Uyghur activists and former detainees
who have described the “numbing, harsh, and brutal” conditions of the facilities describe constant
harassment and threats from Chinese authorities (Buckley & Ramzy 2019).
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According to David Bandurski, China has also introduced more subtle methods of coercive
self-moderation and self-censorship. In 2015, the CCP released a resolution on “the mutual
building of a favorable (Internet) environment” with qi tiao dixian, or the Seven Base Lines, which
stipulate standards of “acceptable online content.” The order in which these standards are listed
“clearly define the political priorities of leadership.” Following “laws and regulations,” upholding
the “socialist system,” and upholding “China’s national interests” respectively rank 1, 2, and 3.
“Information accuracy” sits at the bottom of the list, suggesting that the CCP’s rhetoric of
combating “rumors” does not reflect a genuine concern about factual accuracy and truth, but is
instead a desire to suppress politically abrasive information and discussion (Bandurski 2013).
These baselines have effectively created an unofficial code of conduct for internet use, a standard
by which voices and ideas can be judged and evaluated. Furthermore, they suggest that
individuals hold a personal responsibility to not only abide by the code of conduct, but to promote
and openly advocate the CCP’s values.
The integrity of the CCP’s anti-rumor effort is further dispelled by the fact that they actively
promote rampant disinformation across social media platforms. Colloquially known as the “Fifty
Cent Party,” based on a rumor that they are paid 50 cents for each post, China has amassed a
figurative army of paid posters to inundate Chinese social media sites with pro CCP propaganda.
Research conducted at Harvard by Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts (2017) has
found that the “50c party” produces an estimated 448 million posts per year. Their findings indicate
that the overwhelming majority of the 50c party consists of government employees contributing
part time as paid posters outside of their regular jobs. The majority of these posts utilize strategic
distraction to disrupt collective action or the airing of grievances by giving the impression that
government public support is pervasive and trendy (King, Pan, & Roberts 2017). Essentially, the
posts are mostly pro-CCP platitudes, but some are anti-West spam, posted in large quantities to
redirect criticism towards the West. The apparent goal here is to denigrate Western ideas and
values, as well as to stir up patriotism and pro-Party sentiment by invoking China’s “bloody and
tear-stained history” in which Western powers played a large part (Qiang 2011). The 50c party
represents an effort to actively mold and shape the climate of Internet discussion itself, rather
than just reactively censoring and suppressing it.
The modern culmination of the CCP’s efforts to go on the offensive with Internet
censorship is the “Great Cannon,” a term coined by researchers at the University of Toronto to
describe “a new tool for censorship” capable of “effectively rewriting the Internet on the fly” (Hern
2015). The Great Cannon is a distinct attack tool, which hijacks traffic to and from individual IP
addresses and can replace unencrypted content with malware. This was demonstrated for the
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first time in 2015, when the hosting site GitHub was temporarily shut down by a distributed denial
of service (DDoS). In this attack, the Great Cannon intercepted web traffic sent to Baidu’s servers
(servers run by China’s largest search engine) and, by using malware, was able to enlist unaware
web users in redirecting traffic as fabricated content requests to GitHub, overwhelming and
shutting down the site’s servers through an immense, concentrated traffic spike. Researchers
from the University of Toronto concluded that the origin site of the attack is likely operated by the
Chinese government, as it appears to be hosted on the same server and share the same source
code used for intercepting communications as the Great Firewall (Hern 2015).
The attack on GitHub was significant as the site hosted pages run by anti-censorship
organization GreatFire.org, which contained tools to aid Chinese users in bypassing the Great
Firewall. The Great Cannon has also been implicated in DDoS attacks on the New York Times’
Chinese mirror and Mingjingnews.com, most likely in retaliation for promoting Western methods
of journalism and for their “historical nihilism.” In late 2019, the Great Cannon was fired at LIHKG,
an online forum used by Hong Kong residents to organize protests against the CCP and share
stories and evidence of Chinese police brutality. According to LIHKG, the site received “more than
1.5 billion requests per hour” during the attack (Cimpanu 2019). These attacks are markedly
distinct from the subversive insulation that previously characterized Chinese censorship, they are
clearly visible, high-profile attacks on foreign sources of ideas in opposition to the CCP. In
essence, the Great Cannon represents a geopolitical tool as much as it does a device for silencing
opposition.
In 2015, the CCP’s leadership, Internet mogul Jack Ma, and the prime ministers of Russia,
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan convened in Wuzhen, China for the second annual World
Internet Conference. In his keynote address, Xi Jinping declared “We should respect each
country’s right to choose their own development path and model of the Internet, and we should
respect countries’ rights to participate equally in the public policy making of international
cyberspace” (Zeng 2015). Ma later praised Xi’s vision as the “key to future Internet administration”
(Zeng 2015). Xi’s notion of national self-determination for Internet policy has been reiterated at
each subsequent conference, and serves as both a justification of China’s policies of systematic
censorship and a rejection of the value of an open Internet exempt from government interference.
Xi has presented this view of non-interference as a model for other countries to emulate. China’s
censorship policies have become more aggressive, less insulated, and are now supposedly
worthy of emulation by the wider world.
While Xi preaches a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries,
there is mounting evidence that this is actually “non-interference with Chinese characteristics”
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(Rachman 2019). In October, 2019, the general manager of the Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey,
tweeted “Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,” leading to a feud between China and the
National Basketball Association (NBA) that resulted in NBA games being pulled from Chinese
state television. The NBA quickly acted to appease the Chinese government, deleting the
offending tweet the same week Apple removed an app used by Hong Kong pro-democracy
demonstrators to evade police. Blizzard Entertainment, a videogame company, banned a Hong
Kong-based esports gamer for expressing support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong
Kong. Marriott hotels and United Airlines acquiesced to pressure from Beijing when both recanted
from insinuating Taiwan is a separate country (Rachman 2019). Evidently, Xi’s ostensible policy
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries does not extend to non-interference in
the affairs of the international private sector.
Hollywood is perhaps the most visible and pronounced case of Western-based industry
willfully self-censoring for the sake of access to the Chinese market. Disney’s 2016 film adaptation
of superhero Doctor Strange made notable alterations to its comic book source material, changing
Strange’s mentor from a Tibetan monk to a Celtic woman played by Tilda Swinton, avoiding
Chinese backlash for any perceived connections to the Tibetan sovereignty dispute. MGM’s 2012
remake of Red Dawn originally depicted China as the titular Communist invaders, but after
Chinese state-run media caught wind of this, MGM allegedly spent $1 million digitally editing out
any mention of Chinese soldiers and replacing them with North Koreans. China represents a huge
market for the international film industry, with Disney making over $1 billion from China’s box
office in 2019 alone. As China only allows 34 foreign films to be screened per year, competition
among Western movie studios for a spot in Chinese theaters is fierce (Bisset 2019). While it is
clear that the Western entertainment industry is adhering to China’s standards primarily for the
sake of personal profit, the notion that money ought to be prioritized over anti-censorship
principles, and the fact that these films, tailored to the demands of the CCP, are watched and
discussed on a global scale, is concerning for its long-term implications in legitimizing Chinese
censorship and control.
In the wake of growing public outcry against the encroachment of Chinese censorship in
the United States, in early 2020 a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced the Preventing
Foreign Censorship in America Act – primarily in response to the specific case of Daryl Morey’s
pro-democracy Hong Kong tweets. The law is oriented directly towards Beijing and would prohibit
any American-based companies from firing employees based on “China-related speech,” which
would include topics such as “Hong Kong, the Uyghurs, or any of the Chinese government’s
human rights violations” (Rogin 2020). Jim Banks, a bill co-sponsor and Republican
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Representative for Indiana, stated “Congress will not stand idly by as China seeks to export its
censorship abroad” and that “as long as you’re American or on American soil, you should have
the right to free speech” (Rogin 2020). The irony here is that China has facilitated a US turn
towards the sort of non-interference, steeped in national self-determination, that Xi has repeatedly
espoused at Wuzhen’s World Internet Conference. Further, a US government mandate prohibiting
companies from retaliating against employees who criticize China represents a deeper turn
towards the CCP’s view of the Internet as a virtual battleground of ideas, where nation-states
actively involve themselves and seek to assert their values and strength online. However, while
China actions have influenced and molded both the geopolitical climate and attitudes toward the
internet, the CCP’s growing litany of transgressions and abuses have resulted in a new highpoint
in tensions between China and the United States. Xi’s bid to garner worldwide esteem and
legitimacy for a rejuvenated Chinese state have likely been undermined by his own government’s
aggressive policies of censorship.
In considering recent events, this is especially true in regards to the outbreak of
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Since emerging in late 2019, the coronavirus has gone
from a localized outbreak of pneumonia with an unknown cause in Wuhan, China to a worldwide
pandemic that has infected at least 177 countries. With millions of reported cases, hundreds of
thousands of deaths, and the majority of the world’s population experiencing varying degrees of
government lockdown, the outbreak has become an unprecedented global crisis (Taylor 2020).
While early action and international cooperation would have likely stalled the spread of the virus,
it has now come to light that the Chinese government opted instead to suppress early reports and
even destroy samples of the virus obtained by researchers. As early as December 27, a
Guangzhou-based genomics company had sequenced the coronavirus from fluid samples taken
from a 65-year-old deliveryman, who worked at the wet market where the coronavirus seems to
have emerged. The results revealed a striking resemblance to SARS, prompting alarm and
immediate concern a viral outbreak was underway. However, on January 3, China’s National
Health Commission ordered research institutions not to publish any information regarding the
disease and ordered labs to either destroy their samples or transfer them to governmentdesignated testing sites. The Chinese government continued to downplay the transmissibility of
the virus throughout the month of January, as millions began Lunar New Year related travel and
festivities. Finally, on January 20 it was announced that the disease was spreading from personto-person, and two days later Wuhan was placed on lockdown (Denmang, Yuding, et al. 2020).
Not everyone was willing to follow the CCP’s gag-order. Chinese doctor, Li Wenliang, who
has since died of COVID-19, was imprisoned by Wuhan police on January 3 for “spreading false
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rumors” and “disrupting social order” after posting warnings of a “mysterious virus” rapidly
spreading in Wuhan (Yu 2020). News of Li’s death on February 6 drew outrage from the Chinese
public, who took to Weibo to voice anger and frustration amidst increasingly severe lockdown
procedures. The CCP quickly began censoring posts criticizing the government and calling for
public action, but by the time trending topics like “#we want freedom of speech” and “#Wuhan
government owes Dr. Li an apology” were deleted, they had cumulatively amassed millions of
views. Li was one of at least eight people, all believed to be medical professionals, who have
been detained for “spreading rumors” in regards to the coronavirus (Yu 2020). In considering the
resultant outrage both abroad and within China, COVID-19 has dealt a significant blow to the
legitimacy of the CCP’s tight reign on information. The CCP’s efforts to consolidate societal
cohesion and instill trust among Chinese citizens have been irrevocably hampered by the
government’s insistence on suppressing information and their lack of appropriate action. It would
seem that the coronavirus represents the best chance at the CCP opening up to the oft-vilified
western value of free speech and free press.
However, while China’s lack of certain freedoms has drawn warranted criticism for
contributing to the spread of the virus, it is by that same illiberal and authoritarian character of the
CCP that China’s quarantine procedures have been relatively successful. In a matter of days, the
Chinese government locked down multiple cities with populations in the tens of millions, effectively
carrying out quarantines that had “never been tried on such an enormous scale” (GrahamHarrison & Kuo 2020). Within hours, Chinese cities shut down public transportation, barred private
vehicles from roads without special permission, and closed all schools, universities, and nonessential stores indefinitely. Soon after, quarantine measures were intensified as Chinese
authorities began going door to door for personal health checks and forcing anyone ill into
isolation. Most buildings became staffed by security guards monitoring the temperatures of
anyone coming or going, with residential compounds closed entirely to non-residents. Such
methods, which reportedly resulted in the death of a disabled boy left without food or water after
his father and brother were forced into isolation, have been described as “brutal, but effective” as
China has reported an alleged halt in the rate of domestic transmissions (Graham-Harrison & Kuo
2020). It is difficult to imagine similar measures successfully being implemented in the United
States, even as the scale of epidemic has increased dramatically. On this note, political
commentator Slavoj Žižek’s statement that “it’s not hard to imagine that large bands of
libertarians, bearing arms and suspecting that the quarantine was a state conspiracy, would
attempt to fight their way out” seems prescient when regarding the rising unrest and anti-lockdown
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protests in the United States, triggered by quarantine measures which pale in comparison to those
seen in China (Žižek 2020).
Summarily, a somewhat paradoxical situation has arisen. On one hand, China’s
repressive censorship capabilities, which opted to conceal and obscure the existence of the virus,
contributed to the spread of disease during what ought to have been a critical time frame of
containment. On the other hand, China’s brutal, but effective lockdowns have reasserted the
capability of authoritarian governments to forcefully handle public crises more effectively than
liberal, open democracies, leaving China, at least reportedly, in a better spot than much of the
Western world. The dilemma faced by political leadership, depending on how the pandemic
progresses, is one in which criticism of China’s illiberal censorship policies and authoritarian social
control may have to be tempered by the realization that China’s model is better suited in dealing
with long-term, disruptive crises like COVID-19. If we take the case of the Preventing Foreign
Censorship in America Act as an indication of how future events might transpire; outrage and
criticism of China’s wrongdoings will spur reactive policies in the name of security and noninterference while paradoxically bringing the U.S. closer to resembling the Chinese model of
authority. The idea that the Chinese government, with its labyrinthian censorship network and
advanced surveillance technology, which have blurred the distinction between the real and the
virtual, may become an inadvertent political role model should worry anyone concerned about the
erosion of personal liberty in the Information Age.
China’s adherence to insulating itself and consolidating the values of socialism with
Chinese characteristics in opposition to Western influences can be seen as a historical holdover
from an older age, which has persisted into the modern day as something tangential to national
rejuvenation and a reclamation of Chinese eminence. While recent events, such as the
coronavirus outbreak and Chinese censorship scandals in American media and industry, have
helped facilitate renewed aggression between China and the United States, the deeper concern
in the wake of global crises and public unrest is that China’s model of surveillance, censorship,
and societal control will foster similar attitudes in Western governments as political necessities.
The world is faced with a great deal of uncertainty, and as the appeal for technologically driven
state repression grows in the wake of crisis, it becomes imperative that we begin to seriously
consider how individual freedom can survive in a geopolitical climate increasingly geared toward
censorship and control.
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Perpetual Neglect: An insight into the implications of a forgotten and
neglected historic black cemetery.
Nardos E. Iyob
Abstract
Evergreen Cemetery in Richmond, Virginia’s East End neighborhood serves as a relic of
sacred black space and history in Richmond as it is a resting place for the City’s historic black
elite, including Maggie Walker and John Mitchell. However, in its current state the cemetery has
become a haven for heightened amounts of trespassing, illegal alcohol consumption, littering, and
vandalism. This has created immense challenges in its upkeep, and the lack of development
provided to its surrounding area signals that it is a space viewed as profane, therefore disposable
to the City. This plays a larger part in the contemporary development in Richmond. This viewpoint
prevents spaces like these from proliferating by using the condemnation strategically and also
deeming these spaces disposable because of crime, poverty, lack of upkeep, etc. It also leads
the populations residing in these areas to be vulnerable to the wrath of this view, but also
susceptible to over-policing, increased surveillance, etc. By exploring what the continuous
desecration has done to Evergreen Cemetery communicates about the larger regard for sacred
black spaces within the community, this project seeks to comprehend what this transition conveys
about the larger struggles faced by sacred black spaces, and how this case illustrates a larger
pattern of ignorance and mistreatment of black spaces.
Perpetual Neglect: An insight into the implications of a forgotten and neglected historic
black cemetery
It may come as no surprise that if one were to stroll through the historic Jackson Ward in
Richmond, Virginia, one would be exposed to a grave number of buildings with shuttered windows
and empty storefronts. During a large portion of the City’s post-Civil War history, Richmond served
as the backdrop for an emerging black elite that made great contributions to African American
history, including Maggie L. Walker, John Mitchell Jr., and John Andrew Bowler. Despite the
segregated atmosphere and being located in the former capital of the Confederacy, black people
in Richmond flourished in a setting that was not carved out for such accomplishments (Belsches,
2014). Walker, who has been dead since 1934, is buried at Evergreen Cemetery, which was once
an esteemed black cemetery for Richmond’s respectable black population.
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Upon arrival at the cemetery, located in the city’s East End neighborhood, visitors are met
with overgrowth from large trees and vines almost impeding the narrow and desolate roadway
that leads past another black cemetery, the East End Cemetery. With overturned graves, a
mausoleum that has been broken into several times, trash everywhere, and a recycling plant as
its next door neighbor, the questionable presentation could leave a visitor wondering if they had
put the wrong address into their GPS. Alas, that is not the case; the scene in disarray at Evergreen
stands as a signifier of the endured treatment of black people and the spaces in which they existed
for much of the city’s history.
On any given day, one could collect a myriad of archaic beer bottles and cans, tires, and
condom wrappers, amongst the many other items that are dumped in the cemetery on a
consistent basis. This fact was noted by the former historian for the site, Ted Marris Wolf, who
participated in weekly clean-ups of the site since its acquisition in 2017 (Wolf, 2018). He also
argued that the presence of such interesting trash tells its own story of the site, a story of a space
that has served as the final resting place for many and setting for ritualistic practices in the black,
Southern, Baptist community, has yet existed in disrepair and been subject to desecration for the
majority of its existence (Wolf, 2018). In response to this, I intend to explore the significance of
consistent degradation in the cemetery. Furthering my inquiry, I would like to explore whether the
significance and the sanctity of the cemetery has been impacted since it was left to withstand the
test of time by its previous owners. I plan to further validate the importance of Evergreen, not only
as a city landmark for black space, but as a sacred black resting space whose treatment and
upkeep is one that reflects on the perceptions of it throughout the City. Using supporting literature
and a theoretical framework developed to support the space’s validity as a sacred black space,
this project sought to answer the following inquiry: what does the continuous desecration of
Evergreen Cemetery communicate about the larger regard for sacred black spaces within the
community?
Literature Review
Richmond is historically and somewhat currently a “Chocolate City” (Clinton et al.,1975),
which indicates that a majority of the population is black. Though a Chocolate City, Richmond has
also seen a massive effort to revitalize the city by current and past City officials, which has also
signified a displacement of the group with little benefit to them. In 2010, Richmond’s population
was 51% black whereas the Census estimates that in 2020 the black population will make up
47.8% of the City’s population (US Census Bureau, 2020). In the past decade Richmond has
seen a change in demographics, as well as a move to redevelop many of the City’s unkempt and
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blighted areas to stimulate the City’s economy via hospitality, tourism, and larger institutions like
Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). However, it appears that many of the spaces that the
city seeks to redevelop are those occupied by or existing in the remaining black majority areas of
the city. Such plans have been further complicated by the lack of beneficial opportunities these
developments bring to the residents that occupy these spaces. One was a $1.5 billion plan to
build a new stadium, retail spaces, a building for VCU, and affordable housing in Navy Hill, a
historically black neighborhood that was disparaged by the construction of Interstate-95 in 1965
(Kollatz, 2019). The project became the center of controversy until it was voted down by the
Richmond City Council, citing the lack of beneficial opportunities for residents (Meagher, 2020).
Evergreen Cemetery is a relic of a long and tumultuous relationship between Richmond
and its black community, and visibly tells a tale of urban neglect. It is nestled in Richmond’s East
End neighborhood, which is home to four of the city’s six housing projects, originally developed
as “negro housing projects” (Holmberg, 2017). Nearby are two other cemeteries, Oakwood and
East End. Oakwood is primarily known for the large number of white Confederate soldiers from
the Civil War that are buried there (Hodges). In the same breath, there are some contested spaces
within the cemetery that have been noted to be the unmarked graves of black confederate
soldiers, probably because they were buried atop of. However, current maps of Oakwood do not
confirm the existence of these graves; some do argue that they may even be in Evergreen’s
current site (Hodges). Oakwood experienced its own period of deterioration as it became clear
that some of its earliest burials, consisting of poor whites and freed black paupers, could not be
located due to the overgrowth of plant life in the older sections of the cemetery (Huffstutler, 2014).
While the reasons as to why these graves have gone unrecognized are questionable, the case
could be made that they are reflective of the disposable label attached to black people, dead or
alive. The value of black bodies in this space are not only shown to be disposable to Richmond’s
spatial imaginary, but also become invisible as time passes. George Lipsitz (2007) explains racial
spatial imaginaries as, “the lived experience of race has a spatial dimension, and the lived
experience of space has a racial dimension...The racial demography of the places where people
live, work, play, shop, and travel exposes them to a socially-shared system of exclusion and
inclusion” (p.12). In this article, the term spatial imaginary will be used to identify the intersection
in which race, space, and geography impact how people perceive and interact with each other
and the spaces they occupy. For instance, when referring to the Richmond spatial imaginary, I
am speaking on the ways in which the city comprehends space, race, and geography into its
policies for its residents.
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Another case in which this trend plays out is the uncovering of a massive African burial
ground underneath the site of the former World Trade Center in New York City during the
construction of the new One World Trade Center (Frohne, 2008, p.7). It required the work of
scholars to validate the space as one important enough to even be allowed to collect and analyze
remains from the site before the plans for construction continued.
The disposability of East End is not only evident in the people who occupy it, or even its
upkeep, but also in its setting as a center of gentrification. The neighborhood has served as a
central location for state sanctioned abuses, including the complete destruction of the entire
neighborhood of Fulton Hill (Lombard, 2015). Home to institutions such as a courthouse, the city
jail, and the city’s housing projects, the East End can be characterized as a setting for the city’s
neglect. It is imperative to point out this also serves as an example of the discord in perception of
safety between different spatial imaginaries that exist within the city. While the City’s spatial
imaginary may understand the proximity of said institutions to East End residents as signifying a
commitment to protecting its constituents, the East End spatial imaginary could see it as another
effort to heighten surveillance and police presence in the community. This leads to the
disenfranchised residents being condemned for their upkeep of the space prior to the arrival of
this demographic, facing the risk of being pushed out of their own spaces. Rachel Sarabia (2013)
argues that there is a culture of poverty that develops to the subjection of it, and that it remains in
the space regardless of class mobility (p.15). Laura Kern looks at the glorification of ‘dirtiness’ of
spaces undergoing elements of gentrification and how its previously stigmatized past is used as
a tool to appeal to newer residents. This occurs under the guise of reworking the physical
environment in these spaces but plays out in terms dictated by the white spatial imaginary values
and norms (Kern, 2015, p.69). When discussing future plans, the site’s historian was adamant
that they were considering building a yoga studio and a coffee shop on the site to enhance visitor
experience (Wolf, 2018). This means that renovation can change the way the city views the space,
not only pushing the white spatial imaginary into a black space, but also furthering the possibility
of the space serving as another example of gentrification, which increases the disposability of the
history and the graves in Evergreen.
Theoretical Framework
In further investigation, it is imperative to understand that Richmond was a chocolate city,
or a city with a majority black population, that has been experiencing gentrification at an
exponential rate which could provide insight in how to effectively navigate the issue of Evergreen
(Lombard, 2015). Before delving into the semantics of what gentrification in Richmond looks like,
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the significance of the presence of a chocolate city must be addressed. Chocolate City is the
name of a 1975 album and song by the largely known funk band, Parliament. The song-turnedterm was initially an homage to Washington D.C. and the dominant black culture that arose from
its majority population at the time. The song reimagines the nation’s capital and institutions to be
accessible to its surrounding residents, “They still call it the White House, but that's a temporary
condition too” (Clinton, et al., 1975). George Lipsitz (2007) uses his framework to identify the
differences between “white spatial imaginary” and “black spatial imaginary,” which arise out of the
performance of race in defining space (p.11). White spatial imaginary, which encompases
contemporary Western norms and social mores, values, and ideals, also further polarizes the
spatial imaginaries of those who have traditionally and historically not found this to be accessible
due to collective and communal values taking precedence. These values and ideals are favorable
to the capitalist economic system, so it is reasonable to both argue that such ideals are also at
the root of what success and development are and to condemn the practices and ideals that do
not fit into the mold of the capitalist system. This condemnation also paves a way for spaces that
do not adhere to the goals of the white spatial imaginary to create a system of sacred and profane
(Lipsitz, 2007, p.15). Lipsitz’s argument about privileged geographies provides an ample means
of examining the changes undergone in Richmond since the creation of Evergreen Cemetery to
this present day.
When looking at Richmond during the years that it was an identifiably black city, whether
it be through population demographics or flourishing Black culture that permeated the city from
the Reconstruction to the current period, parts of the city did satisfy many of the economic ideals
of the white spatial imaginaries. Richmond was home to a once booming Black Wall Street in the
predominantly black neighborhood Jackson Ward; this is where Maggie Walker became the first
woman to start her own bank, opening up St. Luke’s Penny Saving Bank (Campbell, 2016). This
was in response to the fact that black people in the city were oftentimes barred from opening up
accounts and securing loans from other banks in the city. St. Luke’s and the once flourishing
Black Wall Street are no longer present in Jackson Ward; instead, they are replaced by Interstate
95 that cuts through the entire neighborhood and displaces much of the population that once
occupied this space. This demonstrates how black bodies and spaces are constantly at risk of
being taken advantage of.
This idea of disposability is one that I would like to expand on, in congruence with the
Lipsitz theory of geographical privilege to illustrate the current condition of Evergreen Cemetery
and the way that the city deals with its black population. Seeing Richmond’s black community and
the different spaces that it occupies through a lens of disposability is just a response to the
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desecration and dismantling that has occurred in the past. The case is even stronger when looking
at the issue and taking the changing demographics within the city into account. Lori D. Patton and
LaWanda W. Ward (2016) identified and argued this definition of disposability to make the case
for the lack of media attention to missing black women in their piece, Missing Black Undergraduate
Women and the Politics of Disposability: A Critical Race Feminist Perspective. They found that it
was common for the stories of missing black women to go unacknowledged by the media, while
the stories of missing white women like Natalie Holloway and Laci Peterson were picked up by
the national media and became household names as they were followed by major news networks.
Patton and Ward argued that race, class, and gender play a part in the lack of visibility from media
and other avenues and lack of resources provided through legal avenues in seeing these matters
through to resolution; at one point they went as far as to argue that many of the silenced victims
are seen as deserving because of assumed narratives of black female criminality and sexuality
(Patton & Ward, 2016, p.330-31). The idea that people and institutions, like the legal system and
media, operate on these assumptions of traditional conceptions of black people, in general, are
harmful, yet they are what contribute heavily to deeming such populations as disposable. It is
important to note that this is not simply limited to this case study, but transmissible in most aspects
of everyday life as a black American; it also serves as a valuable lens in examining the possible
sexwork that occurs-could have occured at Evergreen Cemetery. While Patton and Ward’s
analysis provided a critical race feminist framework to examine the disposability of their
population, I would argue that their work in combination with the aforementioned spatial theories
from Lipsitz provide for a solid basis in inquiring further into the meaning of the desecration of
Evergreen and what it signals for its surrounding community.
Methodology
The issue was then explored using a mixed methods approach that employed: field
observations of Evergreen Cemetery completed between February 2018 and March 2020, a
contextual analysis of photos taken at the cemetery taken from 2016 through 2018, and an oral
history conducted with Kelly Pratt and James Shadoian, who are part of the cemetery’s staff. As
the combination of methods to examine this issue is diverse, each method serves a purpose to
adequately illustrate the extent to which Evergreen has been neglected and the larger implications
that arise as it is a memorialization of black space in a city.
The first stakeholders in the examination of Evergreen’s presence are its owners, the
EnRichmond Foundation. EnRichmond relies heavily on a committed volunteer presence that
assists during the weekly cleanups at the cemetery, therefore the volunteers fall into this grouping,
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as well. This group is the most crucial to the wellbeing of the cemetery as they are also on the
frontlines of its restoration and assist in reinforcing the sanctity of the space (EnRichmond, 2020).
The next group is the governing infrastructure of the city and even the state of Virginia. The
Virginia state government has been financially involved in the cemetery’s restoration process after
years of lobbying to receive the same funding that Confederate memorials do throughout the state
(Schneider, 2017). To clarify, this group is inclusive of the Richmond City Police Force, the
Richmond city government, and the state government, which is also based in Richmond. These
individuals possess powers to produce and enforce laws that pertain to protecting the cemetery,
as well as the power to validate its significance. Another group that has also been deemed integral
in understanding the regard for Evergreen is the city population. This category includes residents
that live in the East End, which has a notable concentration of the city’s black residents (Mitchell,
2019), as well as the residents from other parts of the city and surrounding counties. This category
is also inclusive of local businesses and institutions, as there are three major universities that are
based in the city who have also had encounters with the cemetery in its restoration effort. This
category is essential to decoding what significance the cemetery holds to them, as well as gauging
the significance of other black spaces throughout the city. The last group of stakeholders in this
examination of Evergreen are the descendants of the individuals buried at the cemetery, as they
serve as a form of representation to the thousands of individuals that are buried in the cemetery.
Including this group is necessary to comprehend if and how they interact with the space and
whether it validates its sanctity and significance as a black space.
Initially, this project aimed to use the damaged state of Evergreen to explain the city’s
relationship with black space through utilizing field observations. However from the time that this
project began in the spring of 2018 to the present, the early months of 2020, the cemetery has
undergone extensive weekly clean ups that required a more expansive lens in exploring the issue
and effectively capturing the data, thus the mixed methods approach. During the three years that
observations were conducted, Evergreen had undergone a transition of 60 acres of overgrowth
due to many previously lost graves being uncovered and cleaned. The field observations were
conducted over the course of three visits made to Evergreen Cemetery, one in 2018, and two
more in January and February of 2020. The visits lasted about 2 hours and aimed to explore what
the cemetery's desecration looked like and how it could be contextualized in the existing narrative
regarding the cemetery's significance. During the visits, I looked at any apparent trash that was
near or around grave sites, including the two trash bins that were made recently available by
EnRichmond. I sought to find out what type of trash was being left at the cemetery, what type of
activity the trash indicated, how old it was, where it was left, and whether there were any indicators
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as to who left the trash. These questions exist to categorize the desecration as to whether it was
intentional or unintentional, as understanding this could build the narrative of how certain
stakeholders view the cemetery and what value it holds in their own spatial imaginaries.
In lieu of Evergreen’s cleanup, the initial methodology needed to evolve to be able to
capture the issue of continuous desecration occuring in the cemetery despite the weekly clean
ups. To capture the timeframe in which this project was not actively being tended to, field
observations and an interview were not enough to solidify the claim of continuous desecration in
the years that the cemetery was under new ownership. Upon examining the issue further, it
appeared that along with weekly clean ups, the new ownership of the cemetery introduced more
visual representation of the cemetery digitally through posts on social media platforms and
through a new website for the cemetery. This led to the development of the third leg of the data
collection plan that aimed to examine the cemetery’s digital presence and whether the physical
desecration that was being done to the cemetery was equally part of its online presence. In the
early stages of this project, a simple Google search helped me realize that these photos could
serve as formal and informal documentation of the significance that the cemetery held amongst
those who frequent it. The photos of Evergreen on social media websites like Instagram and Flickr
inadvertently had the power to communicate the purpose the cemetery served to them, which is
portrayed by the photos that they posted of it. In response, I developed a secondary analysis to
examine 25 photographs and any comments posted on Instagram and Flickr to understand how
stakeholders portrayed any interactions with the cemetery. I evaluated the photos to gauge
several things: what the photo showed, what the perceivable purpose of the photo and their visit
was, and whether or not their photo detailed or highlighted any forms of desecration.
While it was feasible that the previously outlined methods would be able to illustrate a
short-sighted view of desecration occuring at the cemetery, it was difficult to gauge the factors
that resulted in the cemetery’s current condition. It was clear that there was as a gaping hole in
the portrayal of the cemetery through the literature review and any preliminary research of the
cemetery, that its significance was affirmed through those who recognized it, and many of the
current sources that understand its original purpose are also those who are on the frontlines of
the Evergreen’s restoration effort. In turn, the lack of current findings inadvertently determined it
was necessary to conduct an oral history with a representative of the cemetery. Hence, I reached
out to the EnRichmond Foundation and was connected with Kelly Pratt, who serves as
Evergreen’s Family Services Consultant, and scheduled an interview with her at the cemetery, a
modified version of the transcript of this interview can be found in the Appendix. In addition, I have
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created a timeline using the photos from social media used in the secondary analysis to
accompany the results, which can be accessed here.
Results
Despite Evergreen holding a presence throughout the literature as a sacred space in need
of perpetual repair and maintenance, nothing can prepare one for the actual sight of disrepair the
results indicate. There are piles of trash that have been disposed of, there is only one mausoleum
in the cemetery which has been sealed after having been broken into several times throughout
the past 20 years, broken headstones and metal grave markers blown far away from the graves
they were intended to signify. It must be noted that while the space serves different purposes to
different stakeholders, the data indicates that despite being the historical black cemetery, it is
rarely treated as such by most of its stakeholders, except its owners, the volunteers who are part
of the restoration effort, and a select few of the visitors. The last burial occurred in 2017 during
the purchase of the site (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). However the
space has been used in ways that are contrary to its original purpose. Along the lines drawn out
by the theoretical framework, the space as a manifestation of the black spatial imaginary has been
destroyed and impeded upon, while also watching social capital diminish in a way that in
comparison to white cemeteries who contain historical figures have not. This cemetery has
instead become a space where surrounding residents consistently enter to dump a variety of trash
and a hotspot for trespassers and visitors who vandalize the space in a manner that is detrimental
to its current renovation effort (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020).
In response to the original research question, the results of the field observations, the
secondary analysis, and the oral history have constructed a complex narrative of sacred space in
Richmond’s history. The results are displayed in a thematic order to fully contextualize the
narrative; all themes answer the original inquiry that gauges what the continuous desecration
being done to Evergreen communicates about the City’s regard for its value as a revered space.
Sacred v.s. Profane
When addressing the sanctity of Evergreen, it must first be noted that death in the black
community, specifically in the black, Southern, baptist, community, is regarded in a ritualistic and
former manner. The black, Southern, baptist is a culture founded in the lived experiences of
slaves, places a large value on the role of ancestral guidance and intervention. When a person
dies in the black community, they are given a “homegoing” rather than a funeral and once they
have received the proper burial they are believed to reunite with ancestors and continue to the
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afterlife (Mcilwain 2001). Evergreen, though a nondenominational cemetery, served as the resting
place for an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 people, many of which were believed to go on to reunite
with their forefathers (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). Within the black
spatial imaginary, this space is valued to be a landmark achievement in one’s life as they pass to
the next dimension. “After the soul has passed, another commonplace ritual is to visit the dead,
clean up their graves, and to bring ancestral offerings as a means of ensuring that they are still in
your thoughts,” (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). The levels to which
profanity permeates the cemetery’s physical and digital presence ranges from small actions such
as leaving non- biodegradable offerings to the dead that eventually become the litter scattered
throughout the cemetery to aggressive actions, such as stealing and misplacing gravestones,
which has been a recurring activity that is said to have happened throughout the years.
Evergreen’s sanctity is also validated through a continuous effort on the part of certain
stakeholders, such as concerned visitors, locals, and the EnRichmond Foundation, who
acknowledge the multilateral value of the space and consistently work to revive the space. This
was especially apparent in conducting the secondary analysis. The majority of the photos were
taken in desecrated parts of the cemetery and were often of recently uncovered trash and graves.
These photos were obtained from an organization called Friends of East End Cemetery, whose
work primarily focused on the restoration of the neighboring East End cemetery and often
collaborated with EnRichmond in clean ups and research. During the interview, Pratt was
adamant that despite the cemetery’s disregarded history, it holds many lessons that prove the
restoration effort to be worthwhile work. “I think the more press that we get, the more positive
images that are put out there, the more people will see yes, there's work to do, but it's not half as
bad as it used to be” (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). While the restoration
effort is small, it serves as a powerful force in relaying the significance and intended purpose of
the space as sacred black space.
Despite the continuous effort to restore the cemetery to its original state, it has become
clear that the purpose of the cemetery must be restored alongside the space itself. Evergreen has
become a host to more than its own memorialization, as many visitors visit to use it in a manner
beyond its original purpose, often in a profane manner. While the data sought to examine all
representations of the cemetery, it was more than often that the data indicated some atypical
activity that occurred within the space. Whether it be the amalgamation of the cemetery with the
plant life of the cemetery or sexwork that has been noted to occur here, there is a narrative of
disregard and carelessness for the Evergreen’s significance.
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Prevalence of Criminal Activity
Several pieces of data have indicated that many of the profane and unsolicited activities
that occur on the cemetery’s grounds cross into the realm of criminal activity. In an effort to quell
this type of activity, the cemetery’s ownership under EnRichmond has introduced cameras
throughout the cemetery, signs that warn trespassers that they are under surveillance, as well as
a somewhat active police presence that drives through the area twice a day. My photographic
observations (Appendix), indicated that the notable instances that illustrate criminal activity
revolved around alcohol consumption on the premises and widespread littering. When visiting
Evergreen, it is not uncommon to come upon a large pile of retired items such as toilets, hubcaps,
and pieces of mattresses strewn about, mentioned in an interview (Appendix) with Kelly Pratt.
Despite the precautions set to combat such activity, it still occurs frequently with little assistance
from the police force that is tasked with preventing it (K. Pratt, personal communication, February
27, 2020). Visitors still perceive the space disposable, as many choose to use it as a dumping
ground or a discreet environment in which they can congregate and consume alcohol. These
findings indicate a larger issue that has been difficult to solve, despite the successful weekly
cleanups.
The Braxton Mausoleum
One of the most vulnerable spaces in the cemetery, the Braxton Mausoleum has been the
repeated victim of such atrocities. The mausoleum is the only one of its kind in this cemetery and
was built to memorialize the Braxton family, a family that has been in Richmond since the Civil
War era. In the past 20 years, the mausoleum has repeatedly been broken into, even after sealing
its entrance shut twice. In one instance the caskets were opened and had items stolen from inside,
disturbing the remains of the buried individuals. Photos used in the secondary analysis depicted
the caskets remained opened, with the bones of Braxton family members strewn throughout the
mausoleum until it was sealed. Pratt indicated that the mausoleum was broken into again and
served as the setting for a music video for a local band (K. Pratt, personal communication,
February 27, 2020). During my secondary analysis I included a photo posted on Instagram of a
man at the cemetery, along with the caption, “BTS [behind the scenes] @bewareofbat vid shoot
#bewareofthebat.” On Youtube, I found a music video from the band, BAT, that was set inside of
the Braxton mausoleum. This music video was instrumental in establishing a timeline of
desecration that could be traced through the methodology. In adherence to the theoretical
framework laid out, this instance validates that the band’s spatial imaginary did not seem to
recognize the value of the Mausoleum, or the cemetery.
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Desolate v.s. Robust in Livelihood
Evergreen, though privately owned for most of its existence, experienced bouts of
distinguishable activity and visits, yet still remains a space that is hidden in Richmond’s
landscape. In the oral history interview, it was explained to me that aerial photos taken of the
cemetery recently indicate that Evergreen began experiencing an increase in environmental
overgrowth of trees and plant life during the 1930s, which has essentially continued until the
present day (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). In a continuing effort to
restore and identify the multitude of missing graves in the cemetery, consolidating the
environmental overgrowth is one of the biggest challenges that has been posed to this effort, as
the overgrowth has been a factor as to why there are so many missing or unidentifiable graves in
the cemetery. The flourishing flora and fauna in the cemetery have also attracted an interesting
subset of visitors to the cemetery to take advantage of the benefits of a thriving and undisturbed
ecosystem; “we've had hunters recently come out” (J. Shadoian, personal communication,
February 27, 2020).
In the years since Evergreen’s purchase, a large part of EnRichmond’s restoration project
has focused on recovering graves that have been overturned or hidden by the flora. Trees have
been determined to be a major issue in the clean up, as they are intrusive, difficult to remove, and
have grown through many graves. The foundation has created a solution to this situation that
works to the advantage of the restoration project. Larger trees are kept because they produce
enough carbon dioxide to sell to the city as carbon credits; this serves as a profitable measure for
which EnRichmond obtains funding to continue the restoration project. These carbon credits are
sought out by businesses who, in an effort to offset their industry’s carbon emissions into the
atmosphere, purchase these credits to balance out emission limits. Pratt and Shadoian explained
that the carbon credits provide critical funding that supports the cemetery’s restoration effort (City
Credits, 2020). Evergreen being underfunded heightens the disposability of the space. The
overflow of desecrated and missing graves of an estimated thousands of bodies laid to rest cannot
only be explained through the unresponsiveness and indifference of the generations that survive
those who rest at Evergreen.
Discussion
Despite the continual efforts of EnRichmond, its collaborators, and its volunteer force, it
remains that they are outnumbered in validating the sanctity of the space, letting it drive their
effort, and ensuring that this is known. While the space itself serves a myriad of purposes to its
stakeholders, the significance and history that is ingrained into the space does not appear to be
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a guiding factor for the ways in which they choose to interact with the space. As indicated in the
results, the degree to which the cemetery has been desecrated does not seem to keep locals
from continuing to deface the cemetery. It is the case that Evergreen is actively denied a
commitment to its upkeep that other rich historical landmarks in the city recieve. By mainly using
its own limited resources, EnRichmond has managed a strong and successful effort to renew the
cemetery to a state in which it can serve as an educational space to showcase elements such as
the history ladden into the soil, a flourishing ecosystem full of plant and animal life, and a memorial
for thousands of individuals.
During the years in which this project was conducted, the cemetery has seen a
monumental improvement in the physical landscape and gained national attention for its still
alarming state of disrepair. It continues to be a space in which locals feel comfortable enough to
continue desecrating the space and using it in ways that are a detriment to its significance. While
the findings of this project are nonetheless surprising and fascinating, it was disheartening to see
that significant stakeholders refuse to acknowledge the purpose of the space as well as the effort
being put into restoring it, while many of the instances portrayed tell a story of misuse of an
important space, and many of the other instances reinforce the cemetery’s lack of purpose in the
lens of the white spatial imaginary.
The fact that Evergreen is private meant that it provided some sort of safety from a police
presence in an already over-policed area of the city; this has changed as the police have been
called on to dissipate the amount of profane activity occurring in the space. However it doesn’t
seem to be making a difference, as it is clear that residents who use the space for purposes
outside of its intended use will continue to do so and not get caught for it. It is important to note
that there are implications in trying to move forward without properly acknowledging the impact of
a police presence in a black space that exists in a predominantly black part of the city. According
to the theoretical framework, it heightens the reign of the white spatial imaginary while devaluing
the sanctity that is prominent in the black spatial imginary’s visualization of Evergreen. If the
sanctity of this space and the people who understand its value continue to be denied visibility and
humanity in the manner of this black space, not only will they be disposed of in a manner likened
to the disposability of the black spatial imaginary, it would also a fuel a larger situation of a
problematic memorialization of a black space within an area already weakened by the white
spatial imaginary.
Evergreen’s continued existence is very important for a slew of reasons, and one that I
hope was successfully discussed throughout this piece is that it serves as a vital relic of black
prosperity in an environment that seems to actively disagree. It is my hope that the reader has
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been able to understand the significant plights in which this historic memorial has endured and
still faces to continue to serve as a memorial for black people and the spaces that they occupy in
a city known for its oppressive history. As it has been pointed out, Richmond is no longer the
“Chocolate City” it once was, but it still chooses to foster a passively strained relationship with its
black population.
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APPENDIX
Photographic Observations
Photos of desecrated sections of Evergreen Cemetery from observations conducted between
2018 through 2020.

Note. Photos are in order of when they were first observed (Iyob 2020).
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Interview Transcript
Excerpt from the transcript of an interview with Kelly Pratt, Family Services Consultant at the
EnRichmond Foundation.
Pratt 1:46
You can see there's all kinds of burials back there. And then we have like this empty spot. And
then we have this pile of markers. So theoretically, these markers are supposed to be spread out.
And there's probably, you know, 30 or 40, more somewhere that are missing. So these are
markers. So it looks like trash, right? But it's actually not. This was here when I started
volunteering And it stayed here because we have yet to log any of the information there. As you
can see, there's random names and dates and whatever, we just have to kind of have to dig
through it and figure out what's what, right. But that's kind of what happens out here. Like a lot of
times, especially the more recent burials were for people who couldn't afford some of the nicer
spaces at the time. And so they also couldn't afford headstones, so this is what they were given.
And these don't last very long. I mean, their standard kind of across all the cemeteries, but after,
you know, sometimes after a couple years, but they're I think they're made to last about 10 or 11
years. Just nature tears them up, lawnmowers tear them up, animals ,you know people riding
their bikes, folks still drive their cars through here. Unfortunately.
Iyob 3:15
I mean it's not even a road to be driven on.
Pratt 3:25
Some days I'll come out and you can see where people have done donuts, in the grass here on
the burials. It's very unfortunate but all of these things lead to this mess we have here.
Iyob 4:08
Has there been a decrease in the trash being left decrease since the increase in cleanups?
Pratt 4:15
Well we still have people dumping. Right when you came in at the entrance, I don't know if you
noticed when you go around the curb, to the left , there is a ladder that has been left back there.
It just happened in the past month or so. People still dump. I mean, we catch them on camera,
we take the license plates and send it to the police but it doesn’t really stop people. Just this
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month we had a guy come out and clean his car. He dumped all kinds of ash and stuff on the
ground. He was like, “Oh, I do it all the time, it’s not a big deal.” It is a big deal.
Iyob 5:03
Do you think that it has to do with the recycling center that's over here [next door]?
Pratt 5:10
I don't think it is directly related, right? In general, we've got, I don't know, three or four African
American cemeteries in Richmond. Well, more than that are currently undergoing cleanup. And
those cemeteries are not all near the recycling center, and they still get dumped in. So I don't
think it's that. We do get a lot of trash that kind of gets caught in between our place and theirs’.
Iyob 5:51
So what is the type of trash that you're finding?
Pratt 5:52
In this area, the trash is for the most part built into the ground. We do find lots and lots of
bottles.
Iyob 6:20
That's also something that I noticed when I was here last. I’ve noticed a lot of alcohol bottles.
Pratt 6:27
Absolutely, a lot of alcohol bottles. Occasionally I've seen one or two really nice wine bottles, like
cool designs on them and stuff. Okay, I plan on saving some of those and like posting the pictures
online for people like you who like to do research.
Pratt 7:32
You see these metal scraps are leftovers from the wreaths. We get a lot of metal trash just from
what people leave on site at the burials.
Iyob 8:13
How do you feel this plays into the desecration? Do you think that people [visitors] just don’t have
any respect for this space, or do they acknowledge this is a very important space.
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Pratt 8:28
I think there's multiple things happening here. On one hand, because it has been kind of neglected
for so long. I think there are people who don't realize it's a cemetery, because there are areas
that are really overgrown, you can't see the graves and there are areas where there are no graves.
They've all been destroyed or they were paupers, and couldn't afford anything. So people do drive
and dump in those areas, not realizing it's a cemetery. But we do also have the people I know
who've been doing it for decades. And continue to do it. So I think we have both.
Iyob 9:06
There are dumpsters. I mean, there's like a big dumpster over there [at the entrance of the
cemetery]. Why do people decide to drive in here?
Pratt 9:16
In the woods, there are dumping areas where people would bring bathtubs, toilets and
refrigerators. Those are things that are supposed to be disposed of in a certain way. So just
dumping them in a dumpster is not advisable, especially for refrigerators because they have
chemicals. And also, a lot of people don't realize that there's dumpsters up here. Because they're
the only dumpsters we have on site and this is 60 acres of land. So if you come in at the bottom
section, there's no dumpster right there. It's just woods. But I mean, they're not open to the public
to bring their trash.
Iyob 9:57
Where do you think that like, they get the idea [to dump], besides there being woods. I mean
[there are many woods] that you could go to dump your toilet in. Why a cemetery?
Pratt 10:20
I don't have any facts. All I have is my thoughts on it.
Iyob 10:25
Please share anything, any of your thoughts out of your experience, because you have been here
for two years. So you've seen quite a lot.
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Pratt 10:32
Personally, I feel like this whole space has been disrespected in many ways. From the recycling
plant, built next door, no other cemetery in the city has this noise volume that we have here.This
is our newer section, So people still come here to grieve and mourn but you have that [the loud
noise coming from the recycling plant next door] happening in the background. And some days,
it's so loud, me and my co-workers try to talk and we can't even hear each other because it's so
loud. So, you know, I feel like maybe the company maybe they didn't purposely do that. I feel like
there's an unconscious thing going on here, where it's allowed. Personally, I feel like the city and
all of these other people who deal with zoning shouldn't allow these things to be built around
cemeteries. We have the Henrico Wastewater Treatment Plant back here. There’s like a little hum
you can hear on days when it's working in this area, and you can also smell the wastewater.
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Review of When Movements Become

successfully utilizing a comparative within-

Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative

case analysis of the Bolivian MAS.

Perspective – Santiago Anria (Cambridge

Anria’s analysis demonstrated that

University Press, 2018)

the more control given to the grassroots of a

Chava Evans

movement, the greater ability and power they

Virginia Commonwealth University

had to impose and influence. Specially
power around the elections of party-aligned

Latin American politics in the last

political candidates and political issues and

century have shown just how powerful social

policies to be reviewed and decided upon.

movement-based parties can be. Santiago

The subnational analysis of the candidate

Anria’s book, When Movements Become

selection in various Bolivian districts and

Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative

among different electoral levels concluded

Perspective focuses on Bolivia’s “Movement

that locations with strong MAS ties, there

Towards Socialism” (MAS) to examine and

was more influence by its residents, whereas

argue that movement-based parties do not

locations with weak ties were subject to the

evolve into oligarchies run by elitists.

choices of the political and economic elite.

Published in 2019, the evidence presented is

The same study also highlighted that the

not only historical in nature but also offers

better the ability to mobilize, the better

timely and relevant new data.

political leverage grass-roots groups and

Anria’s driving question seems to be

movements had. These two major findings

a simple one: how do movement-based

supported

parties overcome a hierarchical structure

successfully.

Anria’s

initial

hypothesis

and remain accountable to the cause by not

Despite completing an in-depth case

turning into an oligarchy? He argues that the

study, there is not enough evidence that

link between social movements and civic

would allow researchers to make broad

organizations as developed by the MAS, in

generalizations about path dependence and

combination with an emphasis on grass-

bottom-down structs in regard to social

roots efforts and minimal bureaucratization,

movements.

led to the party developing a pattern of

necessary pathways of research and have

organization resistant to change. Essentially,

findings that merit consideration, unless the

a weak form of “path dependence” and the

same analyses are run on other social

implementation

bottom-down

movements, there is no way to know is

organization structure stops an oligarchy

MAS’s success is related to its organizational

from evolving. This assertion was proven

structure

of

a
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or
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luck.

case

Anria

studies

includes

are

an

Book Review

infographic of 12 other movement-based
parties but glosses over them with minimal to
no explanation other than to state that there
are historical examples of social movements
that then became parties. Any of those
examples, particularly those that took place
in Central and South America should be
explored further and could likely serve to
support the conclusionary findings of his
original MAS analysis.
Although the findings may seem
insignificant, in countries where unpaid
voices are rarely heard, grass-root parties
are not only influential, but crucial to
democracy. While Anria’s analysis was
successful, the methodical process could be
greatly improved if additional case-studies of
Latin American movements were reviewed.
For an even greater understanding of “path
dependence”, multicontinental exploration is
ideal.
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